FV Trident Inquiry - the matter of the elusive document

Unexpected and most confounding press reports have recently announced that the families of the Trident victims have gained access to a document, which so far appears to have eluded them. The document in question, dating back to 1976, reveals that experts from the former National Maritime Institute, after carrying out research at the behest of the Department of Transport, had assessed that the Trident had inadequate stability.

Confronted with the uproar generated by this belated discovery, the Advocate General was quick to state that the document had not been hidden, that it “has been publicly available since it was published in 1976, and was available for anyone to see at the time”, and was even mentioned by the individual counsel during the recent court hearings.

For some reason, the Advocate General seems to confuse the RINA technical paper “Capsizing of Small Trawlers” by A. Morrall, that was published later, in 1979, for the 1976 NMI report for the DOT, to which the families are actually referring.

In fact, it was only the 1979 paper that has been mentioned by the counsel during the proceedings because, as a spokeswoman for the inquiry tried to justify, it had a “better status”.

Well, indeed, the 1979 RINA paper did have a ‘better status’: although originating from the 1976 research, the later publication was a more sanitized version of the document in question, therefore more suitable for public consumption, less definite in its pronouncements and one which does not even tie the 1976 research to the loss of Trident [*], simply referring to trawlers A and B instead.

Anyway, last week, we sent an email to the Advocate General asking her to name that contentious document publicly and to make it available to the public.

Dear Madam,

Following the latest news in the press regarding the emergence yesterday of "an unpublished government report which concluded that the vessel’s design made it so unstable that it could have capsized in “waves of modest height”", which the inquiry maintains "has been publicly available since it was published in 1976", I would be much obliged if you could arrange for a copy or a link to the aforesaid document to be sent to us.

Many thanks for your kind assistance,

Yours sincerely,

So far, we have received no response from the AG office, but we hope that one will be coming soon.

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[*] This is rather unusual since one of Mr Morrall’s later productions for RINA: “The GAUL Disaster: An Investigation into the loss of a Large Stern Trawler” as the title implies, had no qualms in mentioning the name of the casualty that was being researched.

FV Trident Stability - model testing

In a few days time  - more precisely on the 24th of May 2010 - the re-opened formal investigation into the sinking of FV Trident is due to reconvene.

In anticipation of that day we have read through the transcripts of evidence available so far.
In 2002 when the then Secretary of State for Transport, Mr Stephen Byers, ordered the re-opening of the Trident inquiry, we were advised that new and important evidence had been discovered that justified a new investigation into the vessel's loss.

However, after ploughing through more than 7000 pages of recorded oral evidence (from the 40 days of hearings in the Aberdeen Court), we have not been able to locate any new and important evidence!

We were also surprised to learn that, despite the technical expertise that is available to the court, the Advocate General found it necessary to seek external advice on one of the simplest concepts in Naval Architecture concerning ship stability.

AG - "It is true that raising KG is generally detrimental and lowering KG favourable and this applies to all vessels" - Do you agree with this statement Dr Schmitter? [...]
Dr S - Yes in general terms this statement is correct
AG - Right.
(Transcript of evidence of 12 November 2009)

For the benefit of those with an interest in trawler stability, we have prepared a short video clip (see below, split in two parts), which explains the significance of KG (VCG) to transverse stability. [1] [2]

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[1] KG is the height of the vertical center of gravity above the keel (also known as VCG)

[2] Unfortunately, on the Trident the VCG position was not accurately known because an inclining experiment had not been carried out.

Change against change

It is now clear that, very soon, we shall have a change of government. Whether this will bring a deeper change of culture or merely a change of air, we are, however, unable to tell.

So far, New Labour has been more than a government party: it has been absolutist state, subversive society and religion and, as such, it has managed to annex almost everything in our public and private lives to its politics - 1997, the year when New Labour came to power, marking the ‘year zero’ in Britain’s calendar and the beginning of history. 

During the thirteen years of New Labour rule, the evils of authoritarianism and corruption were followed by the more insidious evil of normalising this state of affairs, which, more or less unaware, many of us have assimilated like a bad taste acquired through prolonged exposure to vulgarity.

It is for these reasons that genuine change will be difficult to make happen. The next government will not be able to improve very much or reverse all the ruinous changes performed by New Labour, without initially mirroring the outreaches of the previous regime and similarly expanding its remit to non-political areas, beyond those legitimately held by an elected political power. The risks contained in any such expansion of authority imply an increased demand for openness and good sense from our next government. In the present circumstances, in which we have to correct not as much the doctrines as the excesses of the New Labour regime, the ideology of the next governing party will matter a lot less than their ability to serve us well - imperative which, sadly, is not going to broaden, but to complicate our electoral choices on the polling day.

Dissolution

UPDATE: Reply received from the House of Lords Appointments Commission on the 16th of April

Dear *****,

Lord Jay has asked me to thank you for your email and to replay on his behalf. While we are unable to comment on individual cases, actual or theoretical, it may be helpful to explain the House of Lords Appointments Commission’s vetting role in respect of party-political nominees. The Commission is asked by the Prime Minister to vet prospective party-political nominees to the House of Lords for propriety. It submits its advice on individuals to the Prime Minister but has no power of veto.

Kind regards

*****

Just to let you know that the following letter was sent today to the Lords Appointments Commission:

Dear Lord Jay,

I am writing to you in connection with the latest Dissolution Honours List, which your Lordship and the Appointments Commission, over which your Lordship presides, is supposed to be vetting.

In that List, I was shocked to learn, John Prescott’s name was inserted. Whether this recommendation was made out of political cynicism or in a transitory moment of folly, we have no way of knowing, but we strongly believe that John Prescott’s place is not amongst the Lords - to whom we, members of the public, look up as to the highest and noblest spirits in the land.

It couldn’t have escaped your Lordship’s attention that our ex-Deputy Prime Minister has been embroiled in many dubious affairs such as the rigged formal inquiries into the sinking of MV Derbyshire and the FV Gaul, that his conduct while in ministerial office was scandalous in the extreme, his manners unbecoming of a Lord’s ermine and coronet, his oratorical accomplishments are grievously lacking, and his attitude towards taxpayer’s money has been as fishy as the whole trawler fleet of Hull.

I, therefore, appeal to your Lordship and to the Lords Appointments Commission to block John Prescott’s peerage and spare the Upper House from further dishonour and devaluation of the noble title of Lord.

And I thank your Lordship in advance for your kind consideration of my plea.

Your Lordship’s humblest and most faithful servant,

Happy Easter

FV Trident Inquiry – the Joint Panel of Experts

The Aberdeen Press and Journal informed us this weekend about the latest goings-on in the Trident inquiry. It was thus that we learned that Mr Martin Pullinger, [*] naval architect and retained expert for the majority of the Trident victims’ families, was criticised by the advocate acting for the vessel’s designer for having formed an opinion on Trident’s stability "without the knowledge required", a claim which the advocate defended by citing Mr Pullinger’s decision to defer matters relating to the Trident’s seakeeping ability to Professor Colin MacFarlane.

We are thus given to understand that Professor MacFarlane’s unique expertise in the arcane subject of seakeeping should preclude other experts from having opinions not only on the subject of seakeeping but also on issues of stability in general (issues deemed up until now to be the bread and butter of any naval architect).

How odd is it then to read pages 64 and 65 of the transcripts of evidence from the inquiry for the 4th of November 2009 about the following exchange, which took place during that day’s hearings:

Cross-examination by MR ANDERSON: […] Well perhaps you could tell us then, Professor MacFarlane, what exactly is it about the prevailing sea conditions which has combined with the specific sea-keeping characteristics of the Trident to cause this to capsize?

WITNESS [Professor MacFarlane]:  I do not know […] I do not know the specific sea-keeping characteristics of the Trident at this stage which combined with those sea conditions caused it to capsize.

SHERIFF PRINCIPAL YOUNG: Sorry. You don’t know?

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[1] Mr Pullinger, it’s been reported, has refused to concur with the conclusions of the Joint Panel of Experts  - which did not mention static stability as a potential contributing factor to the loss of the vessel - and has submitted his own report to the inquiry. 

FV Trident Formal Investigation – the distance from reality

“Toto, I’ve a feeling we are not in Kansas anymore” (Dorothy Gale, from the film The Wizard of Oz)

With every day that passes, it becomes more and more apparent that the UK government would very much like the Trident court of inquiry to dismiss the findings of the original 1975 public investigation and conclude instead that the loss of the vessel and its seven crew was caused by some reason other than deficient stability. 
In fact, the cause for the loss that has been proposed by the inquiry’s Joint Panel of Experts (JPE), after many years of deliberation, and which the Government is vigorously promoting is that:

 “The cause of this capsize is attributed to specific sea-keeping characteristics of the vessel combined with the prevailing sea conditions at the time”

To arrive at the above conclusion, without or in spite of the available factual evidence, a few premises need to be introduced beforehand, which when you use a long enough chain of estimative processes, approximations and other abstractions of reality, and when you are not constrained by empirical verification, can be quite easy.

In order to demonstrate and produce evidence about the behaviour of the Trident in various sea conditions the Maritime Research Institute Netherlands (MARIN) was hired to construct a physical model of the vessel, which was tank tested in the weather conditions specified by the inquiry Joint Panel of Experts (JPE), as well as a Fredyn numerical model, which was tuned using the tank testing results from the physical model.

Trident’s weight and centre of gravity details, normally derived from an inclining test, used by MARIN to build their models were, however, a step further from reality since they had been obtained from sister vessel data and negotiations amongst the parties represented at the inquiry.
The weather conditions, specified by the JPE, inconsistent with several eyewitness testimonies and the findings of the original investigation [*], were derived from two weather hindcasts – i.e. other approximations of reality – and then processed for the purpose of providing the necessary parameters for the model. 
How this processing was done and how reliable its outputs were, we may never be able to fathom. All we really know is that the conclusions drawn by the inquiry experts from these hindcasts suggest that, on the day when the Trident was lost, the winds and the sea waves were much bigger than the testimony given at the time of the 1975 inquiry indicated.
What is more, the MARIN physical model was only run for a limited number of wave settings, leaving the scientists to analogise freely as to the reactions of the model to other sea conditions.

Then, of course, the error propagation comes into play and, in the end, the results obtained from this combination of successive abstractions of reality, with their accumulated errors and subjectivity, doesn’t inspire great confidence.

In short, it can be argued that testing the behaviour of a vessel whose displacement and centre of gravity at the time of her loss are not accurately known, under weather conditions the parameters for which appear to have been interpolated from extrapolations, by means of a model which incorporates a number of possibly debatable assumptions and suppositions as well as a series of further abstractions, validating this model against another model, observing it through a very limited number of tests and assessing the test results using yardsticks and norms that have not been accepted in the wider maritime community, takes us a some distance from reality and from a level of certainty than we might consider suitable to a fatal accident investigation.
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[*] If we understood correctly the press reports on this subject, the victims’ families were prevented from appointing their own weather specialist. (Aberdeen Press and Journal, 02 November 2009, Trident families’ weather expert is disallowed)

FV Trident inquiry – variable factors and conditional probabilities

In the Aberdeen Press and Journal of 5 March 2010 we read about the dialogue that took place between Ms Ailsa Wilson QC (representing the Advocate General) and Professor MacFarlane (expert witness for the inquiry) concerning the stability of the FV Trident:

"Ms Wilson said: "The feeling among the group [i.e. the relatives of those lost on the Trident] is that Trident had survived for 18 months and sailed in much worse conditions to those during the loss, so she must have been a risk.
Mr MacFarlane said he did not see the logic in this, adding: "If she survived much worse sea conditions and more difficult conditions then I don’t see how it could be said that she had a stability problem. That doesn’t seem logical to me.""

If the testimony mentioned above is accurately reported, then we have to accept that the concerns expressed thereafter by Mrs Jeannie Ritchie, one of the Trident widows -“We seem to be going round in circles and being baffled by science,” she said - may be well grounded.
For it appears that, in response to one of the relatives’ reasoned arguments as to what may have caused the vessel to capsize, Professor MacFarlane chose to give a rather superficial and possibly misleading response, neglecting to explain that a vessel’s stability - that gives a vessel its resistance to capsize - is not a constant, but a variable property, which depends on a number of variable factors, such as the disposition and weight of fuel, water, ice, fish etc., and that his answer would only be true, if the Trident’s stability had been exactly the same during her last as well as her earlier trips.

The underlying logic behind the proposition put forward by the relatives is really quite simple: if we assumed that the probability of any given vessel capsizing is dependent upon two principal factors:

• The intact stability of the ship – where the probability of capsize is inversely proportional to the ship’s stability reserves – which is, as mentioned above, a variable

• The sea conditions in which the ship is sailing – where the probability of capsizing is relative to the size of the waves

then, for the Trident’s trips, which she had successfully completed earlier and where the sea conditions were worse, we would have to conclude that the stability of the vessel was better.
By virtue of the same logic, we would also have to conclude that, on the Trident’s last voyage, taken in more benign sea conditions, but ending with the capsize of the vessel, it must have been the vessel’s stability that was worse. The suggestion, therefore, is that it was the stability rather than the wave height, which led to the capsize and loss of the vessel.

The obvious question that follows from here is - what level of intact stability did the Trident have at the time of her loss?

The combined effects of the Gaul’s stability shortfalls and duff and offal chute design faults

The principal finding of the 2004 Re-opened Formal Investigation (RFI) into the loss of the Gaul was that flooding of the factory space had occurred through two hull openings in the side of the vessel and that it was probable that this ingress of water led to the capsize and sinking of the Gaul.

Up until December of last year this blog focussed on a number of obvious design faults and flaws in the construction of the duff and offal chutes on the Gaul, and criticised the conduct and outcome of the 2004 RFI which, ignoring these facts had concluded that the flooding and loss of the vessel had been caused by the crew’s failure to close the inner covers of the duff and offal chute hull openings. Recently, however, we have added a summary of the results of a separate investigation, which has revealed significant stability shortfalls (on IMCO’s minimum stability standards [*]) that would have affected the Gaul in a number of her normal operating conditions.

As far the capsize and loss of the vessel is concerned, it should be noted that, while the stability shortfalls and flooding of the factory space through the duff and offal hull openings (facilitated by defective closing arrangements) are two different matters, they do not suggest differing causes for the loss of the Gaul; in fact, the impact of each is complementary to the chain of events which led to the loss of the vessel.

The stability reserves of a trawler may be regarded as a finite but variable quantity, dependent upon the vessel’s condition of loading, disposition of fuel, water etc. If seawater is allowed to flood into the hull, the stability of that trawler is reduced and the possibility of capsizes rises.
The 2004 RFI concluded that an ingress of about 100 tonnes of seawater (entering through her duff and offal chute openings) would have been necessary before the Gaul’s stability reserves would have been depleted to a level where capsize was probable in the weather the vessel encountered.
Our investigation has shown that, because the Gaul’s actual stability reserves were initially much lower than those assumed by the RFI, capsize would have been probable after only a modest ingress of seawater.

However, regardless of the design faults in the chutes’ closing arrangements, the Gaul’s stability problems and their combined effect on the safety of the vessel, the 2004 RFI was still content to attribute her loss to a failure on the part of the crew to close and secure the duff and offal lids during the storm they encountered on 8 February 1974.
Their conclusion, however, appears now extremely far-fetched.
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[*] One of the most important safety standards for a sea-going trawler is that it should meet the IMCO minimum stability criteria, however:

- Compliance with the IMCO minimum stability standard does not guarantee that a trawler will be safe from capsize in severe weather
- A trawler having stability reserves that significantly exceed the IMCO minimum standard is unlikely to capsize in severe weather
- Non-compliance with the IMCO minimum stability standard does not automatically mean that a trawler is likely to capsize in severe weather
- A trawler having stability reserves that fall significantly below the IMCO minimum standard is likely to capsize in severe weather.

The Stability of the Trawler Gaul (part 2)

36 years have passed since the trawler Gaul sank in the Barents Sea on the 8th of February 1974 and 5 years since the Re-opened Formal Investigation into its loss laid the blame for the tragedy with her crew. Today, by way of remembrance, we are going to reveal a few more facts about the stability of the trawler Gaul.

On 5 December 1972 the Department of Trade (DOT) finally completed their examination of the stability of the Ranger Castor (renamed Gaul in 1973) and issued their official stability certificate:

This document was meant to attest that the Gaul’s reserves of stability in her foreseeable sailing conditions had been examined by the DOT and found to satisfy IMCO’s minimum stability standards.

Unfortunately, the stability documentation that had been examined by the DOT prior to their certification of the Gaul contained a number of basic errors and, what is more, it did not reflect the fact that two of Gaul’s seawater ballast tanks had been converted to carry fuel oil. The effects of this conversion were, however, significant for the vessel’s stability because they meant that she could no longer meet the IMCO’s minimum stability standards in all of her operating conditions.

The Original Formal Investigation (OFI) September - October 1974

In the original formal investigation, the Builders, the Owners and the DOT were all able to draw upon the testimony of their expert witnesses who were well versed in ship stability matters; unfortunately, the same cannot be said for the relatives of the deceased who, instead, had to rely upon the integrity of the Court.

The loss of the Gaul, obviously, raised a number of questions concerning the safety of her remaining sister vessels, and, therefore, a part of the 1974 OFI was spent in considering the safety of the Ranger C class vessels [1] as a whole.
The effect of the ballast tank conversion on the stability of the Ranger vessels was examined in some depth, leading to the agreed view [2] that, even if these vessels sailed with fuel oil (instead of water ballast) in their no 2 Double Bottom tanks, the IMCO minimum stability criteria would still be met provided operational measures (i.e. where the ships’ staff were instructed on the sequence of fuel tank usage) were implemented, and that these would be sufficient to ensure the safety of the remaining vessels.

An extract from the transcripts of evidence for Day 12 OFI:

(Mr Ward represented the Gaul’s builders - Brooke Marine and Mr Gilfillan was an independent consultant Naval Architect who had been engaged by the Gaul’s owners to examine the safety of their Ranger Class vessels.
In the above transcript they were discussing the content of a letter concerning fuel tank usage that had been sent by the owners, shortly after the Gaul was lost, to the skipper of the Kelt, a sister vessel to the Gaul.)

This operational measure (i.e. that the No.2 double bottom tank was to be used only when the ship was fully laden or on her homeward passage) was introduced prior to the completion of Mr Gilfillan’s detailed research into the safety of the Ranger vessels, in which he would draw a different conclusion: namely that - in order to improve their operational stability following the conversion of their no 2 DB tanks for fuel oil - between 20 and 50 tons of permanent ballast should be provided onboard the Gaul’s remaining sister vessels.

Extract from transcripts of evidence Day 11 OFI - 8th October 1974

The lie

In the above extract from the OFI transcripts, it can be seen that the DOT’s counsel (Mr Brice) is asking the witness patently leading questions, suggesting to him that operational procedures would be sufficient to ensure compliance with IMCO stability standards, and also that such procedures were, perhaps, preferable to the provision of 20-50 tones of permanent ballast.

With regard to stability following the conversion of no 2 DB tank for carriage of fuel oil, the shipyard’s hand calculations [3] of 1974 can be readily replicated, and these clearly show that the IMCO stability criteria would not have been met in all of the Gaul’s normal operating conditions, regardless of any diligent skipper’s desire to ensure ‘proper distribution and use of fuel’ and the ‘proper operation of the ship’, as Mr Brice puts it.

Such calculations show that not only was the OFI proposition, that operational measures would suffice, incorrect, but it was also a lie. In carrying out their detailed analyses of the Gaul’s stability reserves, the owners, the builders and the DOT would all have been well aware of the fact that it was not possible for the vessel (as modified) to meet the IMCO minimum stability criteria for the ‘arrival in port’ condition and the seagoing conditions that preceded it.

In fact Mr Gilfillan admits this in paragraph 3 above, but Mr Brice quickly brushes over this fact by suggesting that a lack of adequate stability would only arise if the vessel were “improperly operated”.
(Note: Mr Brice’s rejoinder to Mr Gilfillan’s advice: “but not in all conditions” should have been to seek clarification regarding those conditions in which the vessel did not meet IMCO minimum stability criteria.)

Additionally, the appropriate viewpoint [4] for the DOT, in terms of trawler safety, should have been that an operational solution (which would still retain the inherent risk of human error) for a stability shortfall would always be inferior to a permanent solution that restored a ship’s stability to its desired condition.
The provision of permanent ballast onboard the Gaul’s sisters would have been a permanent solution, and one that would not have affected the vessels’ ability to catch fish or the quantity of catch (470 tons) that they could carry.

The Re-opened Formal Investigation 2004 (RFI)

During the 2004 RFI, the cover-up that had its origins in the 1974 OFI was duly consolidated, orchestrated by the DfT who were familiar with the Gaul case and the issue of her questionable stability.

Additionally, a new cover-up was put in place, one that would also conceal the obvious design faults in the duff and offal chutes on the Gaul and put the cause for her loss down to ‘crew and operator error’.

The cover-up continues to this day.

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[1] Ranger Cadmus, Ranger Calliope, Ranger Callisto and Ranger Castor (Gaul)

[2] Consensus between the DOT, the Owners and the Builders. It should be noted that all three parties had an interest in obtaining a favourable outcome from the formal investigation, as all could be open to criticism:
- The DOT, who only carried out a superficial document review prior to erroneously certifying the Gaul’s stability in 1972
- The builders, who had produced the Gaul’s stability documentation which contained errors and which over-estimated the Gaul’s stability reserves
- The Owners who had operated the vessel outwith the scope of Gaul’s official stability documentation.

[3] Manual integration of statical stability curves using Simpson’s rules. Calculations have also been carried out using modern ship stability software (with free trim capabilities and automatic free surface correction for tanks) and these show that (after correction for shipyard errors) whenever fishing was poor, the vessel would have had to leave the fishing grounds at a point when approximately 50% of their fuel had been used, to enable them to arrive back in port with more than 100 tons of fuel remaining onboard (this residual weight of fuel was necessary to enable the vessel to meet the IMCO stability criteria on the return voyage). In brief, the conversion of the number 2 Double bottom water ballast tanks for the carriage of fuel oil did not actually extend the operational range of the vessels, it merely substituted fuel oil for seawater, which still had to remain onboard the vessel as ‘ballast’ if minimum stability standards were to be met.

[4] The DOT’s unusual views regarding the provision of ballast become more explicable if we consider that, had permanent ballast been proposed for the Gaul’s sister vessels following the Formal Investigation, then this would have indicated that there had been a fundamental flaw with the Gaul’s stability. Whereas, if safety improvements were required that were of an operational nature only, then it could be argued that the effects of the fuel tank conversion had not been really significant and that the Gaul’s intact stability had been basically satisfactory and that, therefore, the DOT’s certification of the Gaul’s stability documentation in 1972 had not been incorrect.

The team

There is nothing unusual in the fact that political parties suffer, at times, from internal fighting and rebellion; what is remarkable is that our New Labour Party has been doing it with the periodicity of a lunar phenomenon, and that our beleaguered Prime Minister has managed to survive, although not unscathed, each attempt to unseat him.

The most tiresome aspect, however, is that after each spell of hostility comes the pacification, and, if you can still stomach the Labour Party’s unending treachery and backstabbing, you may find the bogus kissing and making-up that usually follow - together with all those group photos where prominent members of the cabinet, madly, parade their unity – far more distasteful.
As George Eliot said, there are victories worse than a defeat, and our Prime Minister's latest victory could be safely categorised as one of those. Because, after their latest ‘surrender’, the New Labour rebels seem, nonetheless, to have won additional power and have even acquired prime ministerial prerogatives. The PM himself, it has been suggested, is now a captive and seemingly afraid of his cabinet.
And, like burglars trashing the house they’ve just robbed, after having tied the owners to their chairs, the New Labour insurgents, we ourselves have noticed, now appear free to cause as much mischief as they please.

Caught between a disappearing past and a terrifying future, the New Labour team - representatives not of the people, but of those moneyed interests and shady business networks that sponsored their access to power - have a lot to fear from a change of regime. As the prospect of the coming election starts to hit home - having confiscated our reality and arrogated its powers - the realisation of their inevitable removal from office is leading the New Labour team to desperation and absurdity.

The stability of the trawler Gaul

To bring in the New Year with a bang, we would like to announce the outcome of an independent, critical and detailed investigation into the operational stability reserves of the freezer trawler Gaul. The results of this investigation reveal that, contrary to the many official pronouncements that were made on this matter (in 1974, 1980, 1999 and 2004), the Gaul’s reserves of intact stability did not in fact meet the minimum standards and norms that were expected for a fishing vessel built in the early 1970s (ref. IMCO “Recommendation on Intact Stability of Fishing Vessels” 1968).

An extract from the final report of the Formal Investigation into the loss of the Gaul (1974) gives the first pronouncement on this matter:

When the stern-trawler Gaul and her crew left Hull at 6 AM on the morning of 22 January 1974 for the Barents Sea fishing grounds, they were not putting to sea in an “exceptionally seaworthy vessel” nor in one that “had excellent sea-keeping characteristics and a large range of intact stability” [1] as the hyperbole in the 1999 MAIB report into the loss of the Gaul would have us believe, instead they were setting out for a destination notorious for poor weather, in a ship, which did not meet the IMCO basic stability standards [2] in the sailing conditions that were normal for her service.

What made things worse, however, was the fact that due to a number of oversights and design errors, the official stability documentation that was provided onboard the Gaul for the use of the Skipper (although certified by the Department of Trade) over-estimated the vessel’s reserves of intact stability to such an extent that anyone using it would not have been able to identify when the vessel was approaching any marginal or critical stability conditions.

Added to that, and most important of all, was the fact that, shortly after her delivery, the Gaul’s owners converted two of her double bottom tanks to enable them to carry fuel oil instead of ballast water (ballast water was required on the Gaul to ensure that the vessel could maintain adequate stability in all anticipated sailing conditions), but the stability documents were not revised to take account of this significant modification.

The effects of this alteration could only be described as disastrous from the viewpoint of the Gaul’s ability to meet the IMCO stability standards (see example in Annex 1) and, in fact, on the day of her loss it is probable that, unbeknownst to her skipper, she was sailing in a marginal or deficient stability condition [3].

In 2004, the officials charged with conducting the Re-opened Formal Investigation into the loss of the Gaul managed to convince themselves, but not many others, that factory deck flooding, resulting from crew error was the reason why the Gaul had capsized and foundered.
Design faults, which could lead to such flooding, and the fact that the Gaul had inadequate stability for her proposed service were two critical issues that were kept strictly off the agenda.

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[1] MAIB - the Marine Accident Investigation Branch of the DfT

[2] The IMCO stability criteria have been recognized for more than forty years now as being the minimum base stability standard that should be met by seagoing trawlers to ensure safety at sea.

[3] From the viewpoint of stability assessment, the exact condition of the Gaul at the time of her loss cannot be accurately gauged and minor differences in assumptions made as to the amount of fish and gear onboard, fuel consumption, tank usage etc could take the vessel from a marginal ‘pass’ to a significant ‘fail’ (vis-à-vis the IMCO minimum standard).

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The table above shows that the vessel fails to meet four of the IMCO’s six minimum stability criteria (i.e. the GZ areas and the initial GM value) in the given sailing condition and that the failure is neither marginal nor borderline, but a failure by a substantial margin (see differences between minimum stability criteria and the actual values). (Downloadable PDF version at http://freepdfhosting.com/7ecaf3651a.pdf)

Happy New Year!

Merry Christmas - 2009

FV Trident Formal Investigation – financial pressures

The latest news trickling from the FV Trident formal inquiry is rather disquieting. An article in the Times informs us that the relatives of the seven fishermen who lost their lives when the Trident went down in 1974 are now threatened by the government with financial ruin if they continue to press for a correct and unbiased investigation.

Although in 2002 Stephen Byers, then Secretary of State for Transport, promised that the government will honour its obligation to fund the proceedings, and despite the fact that the families have had no say in how the £3 million costs incurred to date have been decided, the government now has the gall to warn the families that they will not be reimbursed for the costs of essential technical assistance, unless they cease their quest for the truth and fall in with the government’s preferred version of events.

Yes, £3 million is a significant amount, but it was the government alone who chose to spend this sum and what to spend it on. The new model-testing performed in Holland, for instance, was not really necessary except to bolster the government’s proposition that it was a big wave rather than poor design that had been responsible for the vessel’s loss (comprehensive model tests had already been carried out in the late seventies, which indicated that poor stability on the Trident could have led to her capsize).
This blatant bullying of the Trident widows shows the level that our government officials will sink to in order to maintain the myth that there is no gain in pursuing justice and to avoid, perhaps, creating a point of reference for other similarly contentious inquiries.

The Times article also mentions that the victims’ families are determined to look further into the possibility that Trident had stability problems, and that the pursuit of this line of inquiry “would involve raising the vessel from the seabed”.
In fact, this is not really the case. In 1975, at the end of the first formal investigation, and 26 years before the wreck of the Trident was discovered, the Court felt confident enough to be able to conclude:
“The Court considers it probable that deficient stability in her design contributed to her foundering.”
Since then, the only new thing that has emerged is the evidence from the underwater survey of the wreck, which appears to attach even more weight to that probability.

Raising the vessel from the seabed may (depending on the state of the wreckage) provide the experts with some additional information that would improve the accuracy of their stability calculations. However, this is uncertain, and it may well be that, at the end of the day, the information already available from the sister vessel (and from the inclining test carried out on the Trident in Middlesbrough) provides the most realistic basis for a suitable assessment of the Trident’s stability.

Anyway, the biggest problem is that the Advocate General has already made it clear that she is determined not to allow an inquiry into the sinking of a vessel focus on the vessel’s design. Now, the stability of the vessel may be assessed one way or the other, but how do you solve that?

The public bath

By definition, a public inquiry is said to be a search for truth regarding the causes of some terrible incident or man-made disaster, conducted in the public interest and in the public view - the results from such investigations being deemed beneficial to our understanding of what went wrong with our actions and what measures need to be taken in future so as to avoid similar mishaps.

In New Labour Britain, however - in this respect as in many others - the theory is very much divorced from the actual fact. Many public inquiries have opened and closed, leaving us not much the wiser, only a lot shorter of public cash.
So what are these inquiries for?

The most recent and prominent example is the ongoing Chilcot inquiry into the circumstances that led to the war in Iraq.
Like the investigations into maritime accidents (in which we have a greater interest), the search for the truth about the Iraq war has been a process in need of several re-iterations [1] - each of them having left the public dissatisfied.

Confronted with the horrid necessity of having to satisfy people’s curiosity and diffuse various social tensions, governments are not inimical to the idea of setting up public inquiries, but, if there is any risk of political humiliation, they make sure that these affairs will not seek out the truth in earnest or learn any lessons from it – except, perhaps, on how to circumvent the facts more effectively next time around.

As it can be said about many other similar undertakings before it, the Chilcot inquiry could have easily not existed [2]. Since many in the political Establishment know only too well what really happened and who is to blame and why, it would have been a lot easier (and cheaper) if the truth had been publicly revealed, without too much ceremony and vacillation, and the appropriate corrective/retributive actions had then been taken as required.

But discovering the truth is not what a public inquiry is about. Is it? A public inquiry, nowadays, is more like a communal bath – a public place of sensual abandonment and ritual lustration - where the interested parties, hiding their nudity from the public behind clouds of steam and odorous suds, soak together in opulent lather, scrubbing each other’s backs. Its purpose is simply to make them appear purer in the end, and leave them more relaxed - and smelling of flowers.

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[1] See the Hutton inquiry and the Butler review

[2] Just as the MV Derbyshire, FV Gaul and FV Trident opened and re-opened formal investigations

FV Trident inquiry – confusion and instability

The Trident was a typical example of the Scottish trawlers that were built in the late 60’s and early 70’s of just less than 24.4m (80 ft) in registered length. Outwardly it exhibited no obvious characteristics or features that would set it apart from the other similar vessels built at that time.

This particular size and type of trawler had a proven reputation for being seaworthy in all weather conditions, and in this respect we would hope that, ultimately, the Court of inquiry will be able to identify those critical differences on Trident which set her apart from the rest of the Scottish fleet and which caused her to capsize and founder in relatively moderate sea conditions.
The Trident was only 18 months old at the time of her loss.

Stability

Judging by the latest press reports on the debate about Trident’s stability, it seems that currently, there is some confusion within the Court as to what ‘stability’ actually means in the context of a fishing trawler and on what stability standards should normally apply. There also seems to be some confusion as to how a fishing vessel’s stability is actually measured and assessed, and, additionally, the terms ‘static’ and ‘dynamic’ stability appear to have the Court’s official experts and Counsel talking at cross purposes.

In recent days it has been reported:

“Sheriff Principal Sir Stephen Young, who is overseeing the inquest, ordered him [the counsel for the families] to compile a second document restating his case.
The first order was served on Monday, when the court ruled that Mr Anderson’s arguments on static stability, dynamic stability and stability curves – all of which must be in check for a boat to remain upright – were not clear.” (Aberdeen Press and Journal 18 November 2009)

“The inquiry heard yesterday that an incline test on the Trident would not have revealed if she was at risk of capsizing.
Richard Anderson, representing some of the families, said it is their belief that the test, which is used to measure the stability of a boat in calm conditions, would have uncovered problems with the Trident’s stability.
William Boyd, a director of TMC Marine Consultants, told the inquiry the test “has no relevance” when a boat is out at sea. […] “An incline test is a necessary and useful test, but in predicting what external forces are going to arise at sea it has no relevance.” (Aberdeen Press and Journal 17 November 2009)

A MARINE expert insisted a test of a Peterhead-registered trawler which sank would not have proven whether it was sea-worthy. […] Mr Boyd said a test on the Trident would have been “non applicable” because it would have been carried out in calm waters. (Aberdeen Evening Express 17 November 2009)

“Master mariner Graeme Bowles said a static test on the boat would not have correctly assessed her stability when at sea, and that a dynamic stability test was usually done to check this. […] The inquiry had previously heard that an inclining test, usually done when the boat is static, had not been carried out. It examines the vertical centre of gravity and its effect on a vessel’s stability. […] When asked by Ailsa Wilson, QC for the advocate general, to explain the difference between static and dynamic tests, Mr Bowles said: 'Dynamic takes into account everything to do with the ship’s behaviour when she is at sea.' The test takes into account the risk of capsizing and the threat posed by violent winds and waves”. (Aberdeen Press and Journal 28 October 2009)

Perhaps we should consider the possibility that the personnel making up this ‘expert panel’ may not be wholly impartial, and that their ‘expert pronouncements’ and arguments, although developed at taxpayer’s expense, may be influenced, to some degree, by the specific interests of their clients.

Mr Bowles and Mr Boyd’s assertions, which have been quoted above, unless taken out of context, are incorrect and misleading; they don’t reflect the stability standards that are applied either on current UK fishing vessels or on those built in 1973. The two marine experts also play down the critical importance that an ‘inclining test’ has in determining a vessel’s stability.
Their implication that the International Maritime Organization’s mandatory requirements for inclining experiments and stability [1] were developed for purposes other than vessels operating at sea is really quite surprising.

Currently, inclining tests are an essential part of the statutory processes that ensure UK fishing vessels have adequate stability while operating at sea. (ref. Merchant Shipping Notice 1770 – contains mandatory static and dynamical stability criteria for contemporary fishing vessels of a type and size similar to Trident).

It may be useful, perhaps, to provide some clarification on the types of ‘stability’ that have been discussed during this inquiry:

All vessels have an inbuilt or inherent level of stability/resistance to capsize; however, this remains an ‘unknown quantity’ until an inclining test has been carried out. The inclining test enables the weight of the vessel and the position of its centre of gravity to be determined. It is only when these values are known that the elements of a vessel’s static and dynamical stability can be calculated and compared against the standards that are required to ensure safety at sea.

Stability (in ships) - is a measure of a ships ability to return to its upright position after being heeled through some angle to port or to starboard. The tendency of a ship to ‘right itself’ is caused by the horizontal separation of the ships weight and buoyancy forces when it is heeled. The term ‘stability’ has a distinct meaning for commercial seagoing vessels and its values may be calculated accurately for different sailing conditions. The principal stability standards that are applied in the UK today are those laid down by the International Maritime Organization in the form of static and dynamical stability criteria, all of which a vessel must meet before it can put to sea.
While the IMO criteria have been developed from ‘static’ rather than ‘dynamic’ considerations and do not explicitly take ship motions and sea conditions into account, they have been found, after many years of experience and feedback from the world’s seagoing fleets, to provide a base stability standard that will prevent a vessel from capsizing in all but the most severe of weather conditions.

Inclining experiment - An inclining experiment neither measures nor tests a vessel’s stability. The purpose of an inclining experiment is to provide data that will enable a vessel’s displacement (weight) and the position of its centre of gravity to be determined. The inclining test is ‘static’ in nature and must be carried out in flat, calm conditions with the vessel in equilibrium in order to obtain accurate results. The results from an inclining experiment are essential for the accurate determination of a vessel’s stability characteristics.

Static stability (righting moment) – For a ship, the static stability at any given heel angle is the product of the horizontal separation (called GZ) between the vertical lines of action of the ship’s buoyancy force and of its weight multiplied with its displacement (note these two lines of action pass through the ship’s centre of buoyancy and centre of gravity respectively). The value of GZ varies with the angle of heel, and, if this variation is plotted from 0 degrees to (say) 90 degrees, something called a curve of statical stability is obtained.

Dynamical stability – If the area under the curve of statical stability is calculated up to any particular angle or between two inclined angles then this is known as the dynamical stability for the vessel (for the range of inclinations considered). It is a measure of the work required to be done or energy expended when forcing the vessel to heel to that angle.

Dynamic stability – This is a term that currently has different meanings for different people within the maritime industry. Traditionally it has been used instead of the term ‘Dynamical stability’ and additionally it has been used to describe a vessel’s ‘directional stability’ (ref Rawson & Tupper – Basic Ship theory) but, nowadays, more often than not, it is used (or misused) in a generic sense to describe the various properties that a ship may exhibit when in motion in a seaway.
Recently, as a result of concerns on stability fluctuations on large vessels such as Container or passenger ships the IMO has decided to examine ‘Dynamic stability phenomena in waves’ with a view to the eventual development of agreed mandatory criteria. However, this is a complex matter and it will be a number of years before any new stability criteria emerge.

******

It is obvious from the above that there is some scope for confusion between the terms ‘dynamical stability’ and ‘dynamic stability’ and, just as has happened in maritime circles, the Court may also have fallen victim to this misunderstanding.
Perhaps the differences between the two opposing camps and their views on stability could be briefly summarized as follows:

• The Counsel for the families would very much like the investigation to focus upon the types of trawler ‘stability’ that can be accurately calculated following an inclining experiment and for which there are International and National standards laid down (criteria for static and dynamical stability) i.e. something which is tangible.
• It would appear that Counsel for the other parties (including the Advocate General) might prefer the investigation to consider ‘dynamic stability’, for which no industry standards have been yet agreed either Internationally or Nationally and which has different meanings for different people: i.e. something which, at this moment in time, is not tangible.

In its latest revision to the International Code on Intact Stability, 2008 the International Maritime Organisation had this to say regarding the stability of ships in a seaway:

“The safety of a ship in a seaway involves complex hydrodynamic phenomena which up to now have not been fully investigated and understood. Motion of ships in a seaway should be treated as a dynamical system and relationships between ship and environmental conditions like wave and wind excitations are recognized as extremely important elements. Based on hydrodynamic aspects and stability analysis of a ship in a seaway, stability criteria development poses complex problems that require further research.”

It is suggested that while ‘Dynamic Stability’ may currently be of great interest to researchers, designers and operators of large container and cruise vessels, it is inappropriate for this developing field of applied science, on which there is no consensus, to be used as a basis for legal argument in a court of inquiry into the loss of a small trawler.
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[1] IMO - International Code on Intact Stability

Trident Formal Investigation – the wave

On reading the latest press reports about the FV Trident formal investigation, we couldn’t help noticing how keen our government is to establish a new set of ‘prevailing weather conditions’ for the time when the fishing vessel was lost, a manoeuvre which, we understand, is being opposed by the relatives of the seven crew members who died in the tragedy.

At the heart of the matter appears to be the government’s desire to avoid any criticism [1] emerging from the current proceedings and the fact that it would be much more ‘convenient’ for them if the loss of the Trident could be put down to an act of God rather than to deficiencies in the transverse stability of the vessel.

Unfortunately for the Government, the weather conditions that were officially recorded and witnessed at the time of the vessel’s loss were unexceptional (no worse than Beaufort 5 to 6, wind from a NNE direction with a fairly rough sea) so, conjuring up a wave that is big enough to capsize an 85 ft fishing trawler from such weather conditions must be a very difficult task.

Since the wreck was discovered in 2001, there have been two official underwater surveys as well as a series of model tests, which were carried out under official supervision, in Holland [2].

Surprisingly, the results from the underwater surveys and model tests have not, as yet, been publicised, but we can guess that they will form the centrepiece of the present inquiry and show the possibility of the Trident capsizing, but only in confused sea conditions with occasional ‘big’ waves - conditions just like those that the inquiry’s official experts are now trying to convince us were in play at the time of the loss.

Subsequently, we suspect, the inquiry will be told by other leading experts that the Trident exhibited poor sea-keeping characteristics in their revised weather conditions and that it was “poor sea-keeping” in conjunction with a ‘big’ wave that ultimately led to her loss. The real factors regarding the vessels probable stability deficiencies will be thus minimised or disregarded.

At this moment in time, however, the above is mere speculation. We would like to hope that, ultimately, the truth could still emerge from the proceedings that are now taking place in Aberdeen.
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[1] At the time the vessel was constructed (1973) the Whitefish Authority was meant to perform a supervisory/monitoring role to ensure that the stability of any fishing vessel, funded with State aid, met certain minimum standards.

[2] This is not the first time that model tests and research have been carried out into the Trident’s loss by the UK Government. In the late 70’s, model tests were carried out on the Trident and a similar sized trawler to compare their resistance to capsize. The Trident was found to be inferior to the second vessel, and capsized when it was made to perform circular manoeuvres in ‘breaking waves’ (note while these test conditions may be deemed ‘unrealistic’ they were found to be necessary for the model to capsize) What is significant however, is that during subsequent model tests it was found that, if the stability of the Trident model was increased slightly, it no longer capsized. (Ref: ‘Capsizing of Small Trawlers’ paper by A Morrall read at RINA meeting in Glasgow on 20 February 1979.)

Truth matters

Our wellbeing is not dependant on convenient lies, but on the acceptance of true facts.

Truth alone can provide us with an accurate account of the real world, to which we must adapt our actions in order to survive.

The lack of accurate information arrests human progress: it restrains us from researching and acquiring knowledge, it prevents us from discovering what went wrong with our actions and from making good what our ignorance has wrecked.

“The most irreducibly bad thing about lies is that they contrive to interfere with, and to impair our natural effort to apprehend the real state of affairs. They are designed to prevent us from being in touch with what is really going on. […] Lies are designed to damage our grasp of reality. […] In telling his lie, the liar tries to mislead us into believing that the facts are other than they actually are. He tries to impose his will on us. He aims at inducing us to accept his fabrication as an accurate account of how the world truly is” (H.G. Frankfurt, On truth)

FV Trident Inquiry and the confused sea state

If what the newspapers report is correct [1], then it looks like the Trident formal investigation is now developing into an open fight between the Government, with their desire to rewrite history, on one side, and the victims' families, who want and have the right to learn the truth about how their loved ones were lost, on the other.

In the latest twist to this public inquiry, one of the government’s paid experts, Mr Stephen Barstow, senior project scientist with Fugro Oceanor, has now put forward the official line, stating that the Trident was lost following a bad storm with gale-force seven or eight winds and 15-16ft waves.
He said that “in a lengthy storm a big wave, measuring about 27ft, was likely to roll across the ocean as well” and added that the Trident would have been ploughing through a “confused sea state” with “individual waves coming from different directions all the time”.
“The inquiry also heard that the crew of the Faithful II, a fishing boat not far behind the Trident when disaster struck, recorded bad weather and eased back on their engines.” (The Press and Journal article, 30October 2009)

While this makes for exciting reading, we prefer the official view from the first public inquiry (held in 1975 when people's recollections were fresher), which, we feel, may be a closer approximation of the truth than the one being constructed today, 35 years after the event.

With regards to the weather conditions on the day of the tragedy, the report of the 1975 inquiry mentioned that “at that time the weather was dull, with fine drizzle; wind NNE force 5 to 6; sea from NNE, fairly rough; tide ebbing northwards.”

Surely Mr Barstow, being an expert on weather, must have realised that the word ‘storm’ is a term that has a distinct meaning on the Beaufort Scale (LINK), equating to force 10 wind conditions, and that a ‘bad storm’ is usually understood to be something approaching force 11, which is just one step down from a hurricane!

We are also interested to know whether those on the Faithful II did, in fact, record bad weather and, as a result, ease back on their engines, as the current inquiry contends, or whether they described conditions as “giving no cause for concern” and “heave to with engines stopped […] without trouble or anxiety” as mentioned in the report of the 1975 inquiry (see extract below).

Earlier in the week, we had heard that another of the government’s experts, Mr Graeme Bowles, a Master Mariner, held the erroneous view that an inclining test on the Trident would not have correctly assessed her stability when at sea, and that “a dynamic stability test was usually done to check this” (LINK). Mr Bowles, it would appear, is not aware of past and current stability assessment procedures on UK fishing vessels and of the fact that, at present, safety regulations with regard to ship stability are based almost exclusively on data derived from inclining tests.

We have also read, in a previous newspaper article, that Ms Ailsa Wilson, counsel for the Advocate General, warned the victims' families that they might have to face an "inconvenient truth". Strangely, in today’s Britain, the “truth” appears to inconvenience the public more often than it does the government. Something must have gone wrong with this “truth” or with our ways of searching for it.
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[1] As yet there has been no official information released concerning the evidence that is being presented in this public inquiry.

The Trident public inquiry re-opens

Today marks the first day of the re-opened public inquiry into the tragic loss, in 1974, of the fishing vessel Trident with all seven men onboard.

Prompted by this occasion, we visited the official DfT website (LINK) for an update on the proceedings.

Unfortunately, it appears that the official website, set up to deliver public information concerning this important inquiry, has not been updated since 5 June 2009.

Not a very promising start!

In order to assist our officials with the dissemination of public information we have provided a (LINK) to a web page where a copy (c/o Her Majesty’s Stationery Office) of the report of the first public inquiry (1975) may be read.

We would like to hope that the public information that is promised on the official website materialises before this publicly funded investigation concludes and the Sheriff retires to write his report.

"The purpose of a public inquiry is thus to carry out a full, fair and fearless investigation into the relevant events and to expose the facts to public scrutiny. That is or should be the purpose of every public inquiry." (Lord Justice Clarke, THAMES SAFETY INQUIRY)

Brussels Underground

The governed have a right to know what their governments are capable of and serious abuses of power should not remain unreported or be condoned, as has been the case with the cover-up in the trawler Gaul public inquiry. For, if ignored, such acts will continue to be perpetrated and the erosion of democracy and the rule of law will become irreversible.

It is for this reason that we are now going to recount one of the more recent episodes in the Gaul saga, one which was played in the picturesque city of Brussels and in which, either willingly or unwillingly, several EU bodies played a part.

Between 2000 and 2006 a notable shift took place at the heart of Europe: the EU power elite gradually became aware of the fact that the federal Superstate, which they had long dreamed of and aspired to, had become an achievable prospect. The world was changing, power was shifting and the argument that a single European entity could be bigger and stronger than the sum of its member states was starting to make some kind of sense to more people. For a long time opposition from Britain, the national interests and the ‘vive la difference’ attitude of others had undermined the federalists’ expansionist aims. However, things were now looking different, new alliances were being forged between Europe’s new leaders, and Tony Blair was identified by the EU power brokers as the man who could deliver British assent to the new order – at a price [1].

In 2005, when it was feared that the truth about the FV Gaul inquiry could emerge, Britain’s Tony Blair was approaching a critical stage in his mission to deliver an emasculated Britain to the EU. A high-level and wide-ranging scandal, which would have exposed the state of moral dissolution within the echelons of Britain’s New-Labour establishment would have embarrassed and compromised the credibility of Prime Minister Blair, and thus his ability to fulfil the EU power elite’s agenda and his personal ambitions of grandeur. Such a mishap could not be countenanced. Anything to prevent this from happening was to be done, and this was all too easily possible.

Promptly, out of the woodwork, came all sorts of creatures who, zombie-like, would openly stalk us on the streets, in restaurants and cafes, public transport, shops and at the workplace - to pry, physically intimidate and proffer threats – on a continuous basis.

In public places, no matter where we sat, individuals would tag along, and sit themselves closely around us, conspicuously staring at us all the time. They would tail our car or follow us on public transport, in a manner designed to let us know they were there. We were bumped and jostled on the platforms of underground stations in such a way so as to give the impression that they were going to push us in front of the incoming train.

Thugs, haggard looking and bedraggled, like illegal immigrants after a long and rough journey to the West or ex-convicts recently released from jail, would walk past us on the street and abruptly turn around to proffer insults and threats - warning that we would soon be homeless, jobless, disabled or dead.
Various individuals loitered outside our Brussels home; flashlights were shone at our windows at night.
On returning home after outings there was sometimes a feeling that someone had been there in our absence and, on a number of occasions, we found that objects inside our house had inexplicably been broken or displaced.

Sometimes what we discussed inside (or outside) our house, no matter how personal, certain ‘work colleagues’ would also discuss the next day. They would repeat, almost word for word, fragments of the conversations we had exchanged in the privacy of our home, and even poke fun at some of our topics and at the surprise that their ‘telepathic qualities’ aroused. Details of our car journeys, including deviations from the route or halts taken would also be mentioned or hinted at, in passing.

Personal biographies were uncovered and thrashed out without courtesy or discretion by the same individuals. Smears were circulated in the background. Being conspicuous and offensive must have been, we reckon, a key part of their role.

Our car was tampered with, and only by a stroke of luck unpleasant consequences were averted.
Our communications were crudely monitored, as we ourselves could hear, and, in some instances, our phone calls and mail were diverted.

Our acquaintances, friends and family were also intruded upon and, at work, we were placed within a buffer of chosen and 'trusted friends’, while the rest of our work colleagues somehow knew they had to keep their distance, as if we had been under strict quarantine for some highly contagious disease.

Some of the locally hired domestic help and service contractors, after gaining access to our home, took the opportunity to snoop around and, on a few occasions, attempted to openly bully or intimidate us.
Even some of our friends were made to deliver thinly veiled warnings so as to convince us to remain silent.

All of a sudden, food poisoning became a frequent occurrence; medical tests would start to go wrong and be unnecessarily painful, we would be more often mistakenly overcharged for the cost of services and utilities, and every little enterprise we were engaged in would become ever more difficult and stressful.

A well-coordinated campaign of harassment by work associates, public bodies and various others was conducted with - though in some rare laudable cases without - zeal. “Everybody can be bought”, one insider intimated referring to what was going on.
We wondered how much this charade was costing and who was able to sponsor such an extensive operation; “Zee Inglish pay”, another insider jovially informed us.

Eventually, we discovered that these measures had not merely been sanctioned, but were instigated from within the highest levels of the British administration.
We considered making appeal to the law, but that was not going to be easy. Conversations with our solicitor were also crudely monitored, and then, one day, he decided abruptly to drop us as clients.

Lawyers, independent organisations and even some of the journalists whom we had eventually managed to contact for assistance admitted more or less openly that there was little they could do or had the courage to try, while, as someone explained, “they can do anything, just like in the X and Y cases”.

Occasionally, temptations would be laid before us, bribes and sweeteners discreetly offered, and the prospect of a carefree and comfortable existence subtly promised in return for our capitulation.
I myself have received thousands of pounds on a government contract, which, as it later turned out, did not actually make it possible or require me to deliver anything, but just to relax and get paid.
When the bribery did not work, hostilities were resumed and our professional careers were wrecked.

“This is not going to last forever, the right-minded majority will not tolerate such regime for very much longer“, we thought at the time; “Don’t underestimate the voters’ credulity and the ruthlessness of the system” a cynic commented.

It is of course hard to describe in detail everything we have learned about the tactics of our new masters, what this brief account refers to being just a prelude to our subsequent experiences in Britain, which turned out to be a lot harsher.
We will, of course, continue, as we must, with the sequel and try to reveal a few more details about the Gaul saga and its ever-expanding cover-up.
I am pretty sure, however, that what we came across were only a few manifestations of the abusive power that the system has at its disposal, as I am also sure that we are not the only ones to have experienced them.

It is important to reveal these things to the public because they are not only about a fishing trawler and the betrayal of its victims; they are also about the rest of us and, more importantly, about our democracy, which is now slipping through our fingers, like the precious water of Choaspes.

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[1] Tony Blair is now set to become the first President of the European Council.