When history repeats itself

In an article published in Lloyd’s List, almost 13 years ago[1], John Spruyt, was reflecting on the possible winners and losers of another well-known sea tragedy: the sinking of the MV Derbyshire in 1980, which cost the lives of 44 seafarers.
Having read his article, we could not help drawing an analogy between the Derbyshire and the Gaul cases.

We’ve heard it often said that history repeats itself because no one was listening the first time and that a wrong, if not rectified, only increases. Looking back at the unfortunate similarities and differences between the ways in which these accidents have been investigated, these apothegms seem very true, indeed.

In the Derbyshire case, the 1987 formal investigation reached its conclusion “without any factual evidence”, refusing “to take into account earlier research on behalf of the DoT[2] into the possibility of structural failure as the cause of bulker tragedies[3]”, and invoking a force majeure event as the cause for the loss of the vessel and her crew[4].

At the time when John Spruyt’s article was published, the Derbyshire case had not reached its final act, and the re-opening of the formal investigation had not yet taken place.[5]

It was in that context that the author of the article was considering the impact of a re-examination of the case: “[the re-opening of the investigation] would, if it confirmed the frame 65 hypothesis, create a new selection of losers from the [Derbyshire] tragedy”; apart from the primary ones: the victims and their families together with the owners of the vessel and their insurers, a new class of losers could emerge, which could include, we were told, the original formal inquiry team, the secretary of state who convened it and, ultimately, the taxpayer on behalf of the shipbuilders who had been privatised and passed over their liabilities to the government.
The Classification Society who certified the vessel and the ship designers might also get caught in the line of fire, the warning went on. Does this sound familiar?

Unlike the Derbyshire case, however, which was ultimately re-examined, the chance of re-re-opening the Gaul investigation has been, sadly, complicated by the subsequent cover-ups and cover-ups of the cover-ups, which have constantly added new groups and prominent figures to the class of potential losers.
In such circumstances, a re-opening of the Gaul investigation could taint the credentials of some quite reputable organisations and discredit parts of our legal system and of the civil service etc.– institutions once independent, but which are now tied in to the political food chain.

Consequently, very few have an appetite now for pursuing the truth in the Gaul case. If that were to happen, it is feared, it would not only bring to light a previous miscarriage of justice, but it may also unravel a series of other unpalatable facts - some with potentially criminal implications.

Another difference between the Derbyshire case and the Gaul, this time working in favour of the latter, is that the design and arrangement of the duff and offal chutes on the Gaul, which were the most likely cause for the loss of the vessel, can be more definitively categorised as a design defect rather than a mere design weakness, as the design and construction of the hatches on MV Derbyshire was described during the 2000 inquiry.

Thus, while in the Derbyshire case, suing for compensation (after the RFI) might have required some legal mastery on the part of any legal team appointed by the bereaved families, establishing negligence and culpability, in the Gaul tragedy, should be a lot more clear-cut.
Nonetheless, or perhaps for this reason also, there is yet another difference between the two histories: since the publication of John Spruyt’s article, the Derbyshire investigation has been re-opened and has reached a more or less satisfactory conclusion, whereas the Gaul families are still being denied justice.

Bearing all these factors in mind, we fully concur with the author of the article when he argues that: “a few more apparent losers will be worth the lessons to be learned and may, who knows, help to prevent further loss of ships and life.”
We equally agree with the conclusion of the article that the re-opening of a previously failed investigation could serve as a long overdue “time of catharsis in which violent forces do injury to some of the players, so that reconciliation can pave the way to a benign end” that, we would add, could then allow trust in the roles and effectiveness of the ‘system’ to be rebuilt.
And thus, let us hope, justice to the families of the Gaul victims would be finally delivered, helping them to forgive and forget.

(For more comments on the 2004 Gaul RFI please see the FULL TECHNICAL REPORT)

[1] Winners and losers in the five-act ‘Derbyshire’ tragedy, Lloyd’s List, September 26, 1994

[2] Department of Transport
[3] Comment attributed to the ITF (International Transport Federation)
[4] Later on, the accident assessors stated that the loss of MV Derbyshire had been caused by crew negligence leading to structural failure, but the 2000 RFI eventually absolved the crew of any responsibility by concluding that the ship had sunk due to structural failure and as a result of inadequacies in the legislation in force at the time of build.
[5] We wish to emphasize that the parallel we are drawing here is between the 1987 Derbyshire FI and the 2004 Gaul RFI. The Derbyshire investigation was eventually re-opened in April 2000.

Inconsistencies

On the rare occasions when we managed to get a reaction from them, the UK Marine Accident Investigation Branch claimed, hand on heart, that their investigators role in the Gaul RFI had been limited to the mere provision of the underwater survey video footage and technical drawings. The MAIB did nothing more than “act as agents” “leaving the retained experts in the formal investigation to draw their own conclusions” as to the causes of the accident. This version of events was also backed by Dr Stephen Ladyman, the Transport Minister, in his response to a parliamentary question.

However, Para 3 of the Experts’ Protocol in the Gaul Re-Opened Formal Investigation, which was drawn up in October 2002 and annexed to the 2004 RFI final report, states a rather different thing: “A list of all possible scenarios has previously been drawn up by MAIB in consultation with the families’ experts which should form the basis for further work.” This somehow appears to contradict the MAIB’s non-interference claims.

Anxious to solve this inconsistency, we have requested both the MAIB and the Department for Transport that a copy of this list be made available to us. In reply to our request, the MAIB sent us this email. From DfT we haven’t heard anything yet – nothing, except the sound of steps scurrying away from the torchlight.

The Fraud Act

(Crown copyright)

Selections from the contents of the FRAUD ACT can be viewed on THIS PAGE.

"It's increasingly difficult to get straight answers to straight questions" Sandra Gidley

On 11 February 2007, we asked our local MP (Mrs Sandra Gidley) to make two requests for information via the Parliamentary procedure.These requests were to enable us to obtain two documents, held by the government, which would have shed further light on the procedural aspects of the Gaul Formal Investigation.

In the next few days, we will also reveal what these interesting documents are about.

During our last meeting with our MP, on 10 March 2007, we learned, however, that these requests could not be addressed via the Parliament, but by means of a future letter from Mrs Gidley to the Department for Transport – a course of action, which, she believed, would be easier and more appropriate.

OK! Let’s hope that it works, though I have a feeling that it may not.

2002 Underwater Survey

'Secret Agents'

In 2002 the MAIB carried out an underwater survey of the wreck of the Gaul and produced over 3,000 hours of high quality video footage.
The survey vessel used, MPSV Seisranger, was equipped with nine Remotely Operated Vehicles (ROVs), including several mini-ROVs. The cost for this operation, as the Transport minister advised, amounted to about £3 million.

During the 2004 Re-opened Formal Investigation parts of this video footage were examined by the retained experts and a few selections from this material were afterwards attached to the RFI final report as evidentiary material and placed in the public domain – the coverage of the duff and offal chutes themselves, the very cause of the sinking, representing only a minuscule part of these selections (approx. 64 seconds).

Wishing to obtain some of the missing sections in digital format, so we can publish them more easily, we asked the MAIB to release parts of the footage that were not in the public domain.
In reply to our request, the Chief Inspector of Marine Accidents sent us the following statement:

“MAIB was only acting as an agent in the 2002 Gaul survey, so does not hold any copy of the videos taken.

I am sorry that we cannot assist further”

So, then, the MAIB were acting as agents in the Gaul formal Investigation.

What kind of agents would that be?

Don’t mess with the mob

Do you remember this post? It reproduced a communication between several government experts who had been involved in the Gaul case prior to the RFI.


Three of those mentioned in the original document subsequently left the UK and were employed in a EU institution.
(A similar trajectory was given also to a high-ranking civil servant in the Department for Transport, who had been privy to the various proceedings prior to the RFI)
The author of the critical paper on the Gaul Investigation, published on our sites, was himself amongst those sucked into the EU orbit. That is until 2006, when he managed to extricate himself from that situation and, literally, run back to the UK, the EU mob squealing behind: “We need Tony Blair!”, “We need Tony Blair!”, “We need…”
The EU hub, I am informed, is not the safest place to be when you are sticking your nose into TOPICS that could embarrass the present government.

How odd!

(To be continued)

Cherry-picking

After a suitable delay, Laurance O’Dea, the Treasury Solicitor, emailed a reply to our oft-repeated enquiry regarding the missing evidence in the Gaul investigation.

In his response, dated 23.02.2007, Mr O’Dea again sought to dispel our concerns about the soundness of the investigation, this time by assuring us that the retained experts in the RFI “were able to consider the various drawings of the vessel, including the arrangements of the duff and offal chutes before the public hearings”, that “these experts had been instructed to make their own judgments on the evidence that they were able to see” and that they were “independent and reached conclusions on the evidence available to them”.

Fair enough, so far, but what we actually wanted to know, though, was whether the evidence available to those experts included any mention of the design fault that the specialists from MCA and MAIB had discussed and agreed upon some time ago. Was this evidence contained in the bundle that ‘they were able to see’? We still haven’t got an answer to this question.

“The evidence presented to the Inquiry, and accepted by the Wreck Commissioner was that the chutes were not secured and that water was able to find its way onto the factory deck” and “there was very strong evidence from the survey that the chutes were open and not secured at the time of the loss” the missive further explains.

Up to this point, we agree with the Treasury Solicitor. But then he goes on to say that “there was no evidence[1] that the chutes had been forced open by wave or water action so this was not advanced as a loss scenario by the experts”

Pardon? But, we have already demonstrated that there was enough evidence, which, in legal terms, is called ‘scientific evidence’ – i.e. deduced from well-recognized scientific principles –that supported this loss scenario.

The fact that the chutes were found open at the time of the underwater survey means just that. It does not tell us when or how they had become open. And it certainly does not reveal that they had been open for some time before the incident[2]

To assume otherwise is simply jumping to conclusions.

We don’t know how the retained experts made their judgements; we fear, however, that the evidence that was placed before them was selected in a way that rather ‘counted the hits and overlooked the misses’.
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[1] We would also like to point out that there was no concrete evidence to back the RFI’s conclusion that the non-return flaps had seized in the open position due to corrosion. In our post of January 30, we also showed that, in fact, there was evidence to the contrary.
(Note: the RFI relied heavily on the testimony of a former DOT surveyor who had carried out a survey on an older Gaul sister vessel. He had found that the flaps on that vessel were open and stated that they were rustbound and frozen. Had he been questioned further on this issue, the court would have learned that, whilst the flaps may have been found to be open, it was only an assumption on his part that this had been due to corrosion. The hinges that were assumed to have corroded were not in fact visible to the naked eye and, in order to establish whether corrosion had occurred or not, it would have been necessary to dismantle the flap assemblies).

[2] For further details on these issues you can revisit our previous posts and the factor tree diagram.

Loose ends

In the his opening speech to the Gaul Re-opened Formal Investigation, Nigel Meeson QC, representing the Attorney General, advised on one of the matters on which the RFI should focus:

“…the duff chute …This time a single flap lid, which we can see, is in the open position. It is difficult to see, but if one looks carefully you can see that the chute here is kept in the open position by a wire pinned across the top left-hand corner, which I am indicating now with the laser pen.”
This matter was to become one of the RFI’s principal justifications for concluding that the inner covers of the duff and offal chutes on the Gaul had been secured open by the crew, a fact that was subsequently deemed to have contributed to the loss of the vessel. [1]

The image, taken during the 2002 underwater survey, that Mr Meeson referred to, purportedly shows a wire going across the inner lid.

We have also viewed this picture, as well as the rest of the video footage, and have come to a different conclusion, which we now present in this DOCUMENT.

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[1] The RFI also found that the fact that the outer flaps were found open had been due to corrosion and lack of maintenance. Please see our earlier posts on this issue.

http://petitions.pm.gov.uk/marine-accidents/

Rule 42*

There is that nagging question regarding the elusive evidence of a design defect on the Gaul, that does not go away.
The Secretary of State for Transport, Dr Stephen Ladyman, has twice been quizzed about this evidence through written Parliamentary Questions (PQ).
It was to no avail. The first time he managed to prevaricate and, the second time, he referred us to his previous answer.
We believe that, the second time round, he would have had a harder time fending off the issue, had not the question been changed in transit.

When asked why they had altered the query, the Parliamentary table office advised: “the question as drafted conveyed information tantamount to the advancing of argument”, that is: “it sought to convey information and make an argument” and, therefore, contravened the PQ rules. Besides, a question cannot be asked twice; we were explained, “even if introducing greater levels of detail”.

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* “Rule Forty-two […] that’s not a regular rule: you invented it just now” said Alice.
“It’s the oldest rule in the book,” said the King.
“Then it ought to be Number One,” said Alice.
(Lewis Carroll, Alice in Wonderland)

Opéra féerie

Synopsis

Two weeks ago, the Treasury Solicitor, Laurence O’Dea, promised us a reply to our enquiry regarding the-evidence-that-no-one-dares-mention-in-polite-company.
Having not received an answer from Mr O’Dea in the “early course”, we telephoned about the reasons for this delay. (He had had, after all, at least four months to ponder on this quandary.)

Thus, we managed to find out that what had been holding Mr O’Dea up, this time round, was the need to ‘consult the Department for Transport’ before committing himself in writing.

So, we surmised, the Treasury Solicitor’s recollections about the evidence in the Gaul investigation, which he himself had been charged to pull together during the RFI (*), depended on advice from the DfT.
Once this advice is received, he will be able to add his legal ornaments to it and send us a reply.
However, he indicated, we shouldn’t expect a clear-cut answer to our question, but simply another version of the same old song.

……………………………………………………………………………………………….

(*) During the Re-opened Formal Investigation, the Treasury Solicitor, who works for the Attorney General, on whose behalf the inquiry was conducted, is responsible for the collection of all evidence related to the case and for handing it over to an independent technical expert, also appointed by the Attorney General.

The independent technical expert must then insure that all relevant technical evidence is presented to the RFI.

However, the Treasury Solicitor’s main role as provider of advice and legal representation to government departments introduces, we think, a fundamental inconsistency in a process designed to establish the truth, but where the inflow of information is controlled by a party with a possible vested interest.

8 February - 33 years

The story of the Gaul "is not just about the loss of a fishing trawler and 36 men." It is also about "the incalculable harm to people that comes from inappropriate official actions."(*)

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(*)Bert Wyatt, The First Casualty, 2005

Investigation on behalf of the Attorney General

Body language

While waiting for an answer to our question about the ‘missing evidence’ (which, between us being said, was somewhat rhetorical), we decided to address another query to justice David Steel:

What recommendations, advice or expression of expectations regarding the Gaul case did the Attorney General and the DPM, John Prescott, offer you before and during the 2004 Formal Investigation?

© Crown copyright 2004

Another small observation

The 2004 Formal Investigation into the sinking of the FV Gaul concluded, as we all know by now, that the cause for the loss of the vessel was the ingress of a large quantity of seawater through the two duff and offal chutes openings in the hull of the vessel.
The double-barrier protections of these openings – the inner covers and the outer flaps - were found to be in the open position during the underwater survey in 2002.
The fact that the outer flaps were found open, the investigation concluded, was due to seizure caused by corrosion in the vessel’s 16 month old flap hinges and failure on the part of the crew and shore maintenance staff to identify and rectify this problem.
The fact that the inner covers were also found open was explained away by crew negligence. However, the trouble with these findings (as we have attempted to explain in our earlier posts) is that they were based on unsubstantiated assumptions.

Let’s take, this time, the presumed corrosion at the flap hinges. (For a few more details on this issue please click HERE.)
As the same combination of materials, mild steel and brass, had been used in a number of other structures on the Gaul (e.g. for the toggles and clips on all weathertight hatches and doors), one would expect similar corrosion problems in those areas.
In reality, though, this doesn’t seem to be the case.
Quite the reverse, as the following clips[1] show, even after 28 years under the sea, the toggles and clips on the Gaul did not present such a level of corrosion and seizure that would prevent them from being easily unscrewed by the ROV[2] arm.

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[1] Extracts from the 2002 MAIB video footage - © Crown copyright
[2] Remote Operated Vehicle

weathertight hatch mild-steel clips & brass bush

weathertight hatch brass toggle & steel toggle bolt


weathertight hatch brass toggle & steel toggle bolt

Institutional Independence

The smell of fish and bilge water

In the period between 17 and 24 January, two emails were sent to justice David Steel (the Chief of the 2004 Re-opened Formal Investigation into the sinking of the FV Gaul) and two emails were received from the judge's office in reply.

These items of correspondence were concerned with the very same question that had not quite made it to the Parliament Question Book earlier this year, and which was now addressed to the judge:
Was any evidence of design inadequacies in the construction and arrangements of the duff and offal chutes on the Gaul, specifically relating to:
a. The non-return flaps and their possibility of malfunction (i.e. to open under the action of the sea)
b. The strength of the inner covers when subjected to direct sea loading,

presented to you prior to the publication of your final report on the Investigation on 17 December 2004?"

A simple ‘yes' or ‘no’ from the judge, who acted as solicitor on behalf of the Insurers back in 1978, then as Chief of the Investigation in 2004 and was therefore in the best position to know the answer, would have sufficed.

Sadly, however, we were not meant to get either.

A new article entitled: "Ministers face quiz over Gaul" was published today in the Yorkshire Post.

Let's hope that the Labour MP for Hull East had time to read it.

.........................

and another one: "Call to reopen Gaul Inquiry" appeared in Hull Daily Mail

BRIEF INTRODUCTION

SUMMARY OF THE GAUL CASE AND ITS RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

The third round of Parliamentary Questions and Answers - part 2

‘Attention to detail’

The fourth parliamentary question that was addressed to the Secretary of State for Transport concerned the mode and date of implementation of the four safety recommendations arising from the F. V. Gaul Re-opened Formal Investigation.

The Minister’s latest response to this question was very eloquent and reassuring, but, alas, it was also factually incorrect and misleading. The four formal safety recommendations from the RFI have not as yet been implemented and, had it not been for this recent enquiry, it is unlikely that they would have ever been tackled.

One of the principle faults with the Minister’s response, however, is the fact that he seemed to have opened the RFI Report at the wrong page… (!!) that is, he has copied and responded to text from page 280 of the Report, which does not in fact contain the four formal safety recommendations - these are actually detailed on pages 286 and 287 of the formal document.

To assist matters we have reproduced the four safety recommendations together with our further comments on the Minister’s response at this LINK.

The third round of Parliamentary Questions and Answers - part 1

8 January 2007

“I’ve got my mind made up so don’t confuse me with the facts!”

In December last year the Lib Dem MP for Romsey, Sandra Gidley, tabled another set of questions to Parliament. These were meant to shed some light on the vexed issues of the Gaul, which, after previous parliamentary enquiries, still remained unclear.

Sandra Gidley’s requests for information, received by the tabling office on 19 December 2006, subsequently morphed into a slightly different set of questions and were answered by the minister for transport on the 8th of January. (The document published HERE shows both versions as well as the ministerial answers.)

If we compare the last question on the Gaul, submitted to the tabling office in December, with its published version [113499], we cannot help noticing that the formerly closed, narrowly drawn question, meant to elicit an unambiguous 'yes or no' reply, turned into an open-ended inquiry, which allowed the minister enough “wriggle room” to answer as he pleased and keep control of the flow of information. The change of wording from “whether any evidence of design inadequacies, in the construction and arrangements of the duff and offal chutes on the Gaul, relating to: a. The non-return flaps and their possibility of malfunction (i.e. to open under the action of the sea) b. The strength of the inner covers when subjected to direct sea loading, was made available to the Wreck Commissioner...” to “what evidence of design inadequacies in the construction and arrangements of the duff and offal chutes on the Gaul was made available to the wreck commissioner” enabled the minister to get easily off the hook.

The WHAT questions, as any sales professional will be able to confirm, notoriously invite digression.

We must, however, admit that, although open-ended, the question was a lot better than the answer we got. In his reply, Dr Stephen Ladyman kept to the official line and offered nothing extra to what he had stated before. (see the Parliamentary Questions and Answers of 25 October 2006 and 1 November 2006)

And the answer, my friend, is still blowin’ in the wind.

Another design fault

In our previous post we provided a LINK to a factor tree diagram, which presented the various alternative explanations as to why the outer non-return flaps in the duff and offal chutes were found in the open position during the 2002 underwater survey on the Gaul.

We have also published a simple pictorial explanation of the PRIMARY DESIGN FAULT in the vessel's chutes.

Now we are publishing a document, which reveals a second design fault in the construction of these chutes (please click SECOND DESIGN FAULT to view it).

This additional design fault, demonstrated in the above-mentioned paper, gives weight to the possibility that the bolted flap assemblies within the duff and offal chutes became twisted due to wave loading and remained open thereafter. (See item (14) on the factor tree diagram).

Are the conclusions arrived at by the Gaul investigation panel (i.e. that the vessel’s chutes had been left open by the crew and shore staff for 59 days before the accident occurred) supported by any credible proof?

We would be interested to hear it.

The Gaul - 2007

Many thanks to all those who have followed us through 2006 to 2007, and a Happy New Year!

After a short break we are now back on track:

>>> For a short refresher on the Gaul case, please follow this LINK or return HERE.

>>> A more comprehensive and explicit version of our initial posting (“Critical comments on the findings of the Re-Opened Formal Investigation into the loss of the trawler Gaul”) can be viewed HERE

Now, having diagrammatically represented the various possible reasons as to why the outer non-return flaps in the duff and offal chutes on the Gaul were found in the open position during the 2002 underwater survey (click HERE to view the diagram), we can show that there are other alternatives to the explanation laid down by justice David Steel during the 2004 RFI.
The tree diagram at the above link also shows that the explanation for the loss of the Gaul, chosen by the investigation panel, was, on the basis of evidence, not the most plausible one either.

What hindered the exploratory abilities of the investigators? - We wonder...

Interlude

The gentle art of evasion

Anxious as ever to alleviate our concerns about the formal investigation into the sinking of the Gaul, we have continued to press the DfT for their views on the technical paper that we had provided and their scientific arguments for dismissing this evidence of a design fault on the Gaul.

The reply from the DfT eventually came (we have published it HERE) and it states:

“The report to which your e-mails refers is a document without attribution from a named individual with recognised qualifications and cannot be considered to be either new and important evidence or grounds for suspecting a miscarriage of justice under this Section.” (i.e. Section 269 to the Merchant Shipping Act 1995)

The above paragraph gives a gentle hint, from the Department, that the issues raised in the technical paper do not in fact constitute new evidence; so we will take this as our cue to publish a fragment from one of the items of correspondence, now in our possession, which can, perhaps, shed some light on this matter:

The fragment reproduced above indicates that, even before the RFI, a number of governmental experts, with recognised qualifications and experience, considered the design and construction of the duff and offal chutes on the Gaul to be a cause for concern and advised accordingly.

However, the DfT’s ambiguous reply presents us with an intriguing contradiction: if the design fault theory is not new evidence, then the DfT no longer needs to check it -this must have been already discussed in the past, and the reasons for its dismissal known and capable of being shared with the public.

Otherwise, now that we, together with the DfT, have finally come to the conclusion that this was not new evidence, should we not wonder whether a miscarriage of justice might have occurred?

E-petition

An e-petition has been lodged at No.10, requesting the PM to:

"To instruct the Secretary of State for Transport to examine recently revealed evidence regarding the loss of the trawler Gaul, as per the requirements of the 1995 Merchant Shipping Act, para. 269.-(1), and either decide to re-open the formal investigation or present clear technical arguments for dismissing this evidence. To introduce legislation aimed to safeguard the independence of maritime accident investigations from political and commercial influence."

If you support the goals of this petition and do not consider it a risky business or an exercise in futility, please add your signature on the form that is published at:

http://petitions.pm.gov.uk/marine-accidents/

(We will be signing it shortly. >:-))

Spelling it out

Those who are interested in a more inclusive and incisive summary of the Gaul case and its latest developments can read the article published on a New Zealand news website: The Scoop, optimistically entitled: The Sinking Of The Trawler Gaul – Case Reopened.

Shiptalk.com - the world's leading seafarer's portal - have kindly published some of our comments on their site. These and other interesting articles can be accessed at:

http://www.shiptalk.com/index.asp?ItemID=1268&rcid=160&pcid=139&cid=160'#anch

The Design Defect

For a pictorial explanation of the design defect on the Gaul, please follow this link: http://webzoom.freewebs.com/inconvenientcitizen/Gaul%20design%20fault.pdf

What is this all about?

The Hull trawler Gaul sank in 1974 with the loss of all 36 crew. The wreck was located in 1997, surveyed in 1998 and 2002; and, in 2004, a formal investigation concluded that the vessel had capsized due to flooding through the duff and offal chutes, which had all been left open by the crew.

The panel tasked with conducting the formal investigation were prepared to consider a multitude of other possible causes for the loss of the vessel, including the most spectacular:

“… seizure, scuttling, fire, collision, explosion, missile attack, torpedo attack, striking a mine, icing, cargo shift, structural failure, grounding, snagging a seabed cable or a submarine…”

But not an obvious design defect in the construction and arrangement of the vessel’s waste disposal chutes!!

We can now disclose that the design fault that has been discussed at length on these pages is not in fact new evidence. This had been revealed to the government some time ago, in fact, prior to the MAIB’s underwater survey in 2002.

And the government is still, even now, unwilling to discuss this alternative - what are their motives?

Comments from MAIB

We have received a response from the Marine Accident Investigation Branch. Please see HERE.

Nose-thumbing

As the reply from the DfT (see HERE) failed to reveal the scientific arguments behind the Department's decision to disregard 'new' evidence of a design fault on the Gaul, and to ignore calls for re-opening the investigation, I telephoned the Treasury Solicitor to find out his latest views on the subject.

Two months after he had become aware of the evidence in question (so as not to say four years), the Treasury Solicitor still appeared incredulous towards our claim that the findings of the RFI were unsound, and professed, once again, his unshaken belief in the merits of the formal investigation.

Showing that he was far too wordly-wise to be driven down a conversational cul-de-sac, my interlocutor skilfully managed to avoid either accepting our suggestions or providing technical counter-arguments by way of rebuttal.

And, to prove that he had more than one arrow in his advocatorial bow, he now informed me that the criticism we had expressed towards the RFI could not be taken into consideration in the absence of an official written submission (i.e. in paper format) by the author and proper reinforcement by the scientific community - requirements which would obviously delay matters.

Impishly enjoying laying down these obstructions, the Treasury Solicitor went on to give the impression that the Attorney General's office was not normally in the business of examining new evidence and facilitating the establishment of the truth in public inquiries, unless forced to do so under group pressures.

Do you have any problem with the truth?

LISTEN HERE

New Parliamentary Questions and Answers (part 2.)

1 Nov 2006

FV Gaul

Sandra Gidley: To ask the Secretary of State for Transport if he will examine recent evidence and decide whether the formal investigation into the loss of the FV Gaul should be re-opened. [97993]

Dr. Ladyman: The Re-opened formal investigation into the loss of the FV Gaul was

conducted with unprecedented thoroughness. The evidence was scrutinised by leading experts in the fields of oceanography, naval architecture and engineering

There is no reason to doubt the outcome of the expert analysis that led to the RFI’s conclusions, and consequently there is no reason to reopen the investigation.

.......................................................................................................

Asked the same question by us, the DfT send us the following answer in their letter dated 7.11.06:

The investigation was conducted with unprecedented thoroughness on behalf of the FV Gaul’s crew, her master and mate, and the Department for Transport (DfT). The evidence – which included video footage of the wreck, as well as new model tests carried out at MARIN in the Netherlands – was scrutinised by leading experts in the fields of oceanography, naval architecture and engineering.

Whilst acknowledging the criticism that has been expressed towards the findings of the RFI, there is no reason to doubt the outcome of the thorough and expert analysis that led to the report’s conclusions and consequently there is no reason to reopen the investigation).

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Gadfly: The Secretary of State for Transport was, in fact, asked whether or not he was going to examine the recent evidence, which pointed to a design defect in the construction and arrangement of the duff and offal chutes on the Gaul, and decide on the need therefore, of re-opening the formal investigation.
Dodging the actual question, the minister refers instead to the other, former, evidence, which was presented during the 2004 formal investigation, and which, he states, was scrutinised by leading experts*.

The minister knows very well that as long as there is no official appraisal of the evidence that we have provided, there is no need to reconsider the outcome of the Re-opened Formal Investigation.

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* As a matter of interest, it should be explained that the evidence that was admitted during the 2004 formal investigation was collected and reviewed by the Treasury Solicitor (who acted under instructions from the Attorney General) prior to being brought to the attention of the retained experts.

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***

'When I use a word,' Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, 'it means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less.

''The question is,' said Alice, 'whether you can make words mean so many different things.

''The question is,' said Humpty Dumpty, 'which is to be master—that's all.'

Letter from the Department for Transport

We have recently received an emailed reply from the Department for Transport (DfT):

http://www.freewebs.com/inconvenientcitizen/dftletter7nov.htm

The reply was of unattributed authorship and did not bear the usual DfT logo and header. Anyway, we assume that its contents would have been given some form of ministerial approval prior to dispatch.

The response was entirely as expected, apart from the disappointment of having taken nearly eight weeks to draw up.

The reply fails to address the design fault issue that was put forward in our paper, but merely reiterates the conclusions of the RFI. The DfT also carefully avoids to comment on whether this fault in the duff and offal chutes has been examined (either prior, during or subsequent to the 2004 investigation).

Now, we would like, in our turn, to comment on some of the points that are made by the Department:

“The investigation was conducted with unprecedented thoroughness………. The evidence……… was scrutinised by leading experts in the fields of oceanography, naval architecture and engineering.”

Yes, the investigation was thorough, but not consistently so. The critical areas – i.e. the duff and offal chutes - were not examined in depth.

“…….the FV Gaul and her sister ships were built under Lloyd’s approval, with the same duff and offal chutes design. On the sister ships these chutes survived under similar conditions and were retained until the end of their service.”

Ipse dixit. However, we don’t quite accept that the validity of a claim automatically follows from the authority of its source.

As to the sister vessels, the Department’s argument, which suggests that the design was satisfactory, is not sound. Our posting of 8 November (below) explains why.

“18.17 … it is important to note that although both chutes were found to be open both in way of the non-return flap and the internal top cover, there is no known mechanical reason why this was so. Both could have been closed or, if jammed, could have been freed. In any event the top lids exhibited nothing during the 2002 survey to prevent them from being closed and secured using the butterfly clips.

The design and operation of the chutes was therefore considered by the RFI.”

The information given to the DfT shows that there are credible alternative reasons, for the covers and flaps to be open.

Yes, the design and operation of the chutes was considered, but only in passing and not along the lines suggested in our paper.

“Whilst acknowledging the criticism that has been expressed towards the findings of the RFI, there is no reason to doubt the outcome of the thorough and expert analysis that led to the report’s conclusions and consequently there is no reason to reopen the investigation.”

We disagree. Reasons for re-examining the outcome of the formal investigation are presented in our paper, which is published online at:

http://webzoom.freewebs.com/inconvenientcitizen/Comments on the loss 26.8.06.pdf

and it was emailed to DfT on the 4/9/06.
The paper is detailed; it includes pictorial explanations and evidence of shortfalls in the RFI.

Here is an extract from the 1995 Merchant Shipping Act, which will remind the Minister that the possibility of getting it wrong, the first or even second time around, has been anticipated and provided for in law:

Re-hearing of and appeal from investigations

269.—(1) Where a formal investigation has been held under section 268 the Secretary of State may order the whole or part of the case to be re-heard, and shall do so—
(a) if new and important evidence which could not be produced at the investigation has been discovered; or
(b) if there appear to the Secretary of State to be other grounds for suspecting that a miscarriage of justice may have occurred.

“In closing, I would like to echo the sentiments expressed in the RFI’s overview, that the crew of the Gaul should now be left to rest in peace undisturbed by the speculation created by their dramatic disappearance.”

The government’s argumentum ad misericordiam to defend the outcome of the RFI is inappropriate and, considering that this put the blame squarely upon the victims, rather cynical.

New Parliamentary Questions and Answers (part 1.)

1 November 2006

Torremolinos Convention

Sandra Gidley: To ask the Secretary of State for Transport what plans he has to ratify the International Marine Organisation’s Torremolinos Convention. [97992]

Dr. Ladyman: European Directive 97/70/EC implemented a harmonised safety regime based on the 1993 Torremolinos Protocol. The safety standards were subsequently enhanced by Directive 2002/35/EC. The Government consider these standards exceed the requirements of the Protocol and that its ratification is therefore no longer necessary.

Gadfly: It is suggested that there are three reasons why the UK should attach more importance to the 1977 Convention and 1993 Protocol:

1. Safety: There are about 24,000 fatalities in the world fishing industry annually. While the UK fishing fleet meets the safety provisions that are required by the Torremolinos Convention, failure to ratify this Convention at the International level contributes to the fact that sub-standard, foreign flagged vessels and fishermen will continue to be lost.

2. Economic: The UK‘s fishermen have to operate within a regime that is tightly regulated and this has a price. They also have to compete in a world market in which unregulated vessels, having lower overheads, are also able to land fish and this both reduces fish stocks and undermines market prices.

3. Environmental: It is important that fish stocks are regulated effectively and fairly. In this respect, illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing (IUU) continues to be a major problem and one that is contributing to the collapse of fish stocks both in the EU and globally. Ratification and implementation of the Torremolinos Convention is considered by both the IMO (International Maritime Organisation) and the FAO (Food and Agriculture Organisation) to be a key plank in the fight against IUU.

(http://www.imo.org/About/mainframe.asp?topic_id=106&doc_id=3351)

As the Minister advises, the UK has already implemented the EU safety regime, based on Torremolinos, which governs safety matters within the UK’s fishing fleet. Ratification of this Convention at the IMO is a necessary formality that will impose no additional costs on the UK Fishing Industry.

More Parliamentary Questions, Answers and Comments to come...

Sister Vessels

Yesterday we received a letter from the DfT purporting to answer our previous queries. We will publish it on this site and comment on its contents shortly. For starters, we are addressing the department’s inference that there was no design defect on the Gaul, because the sister vessels, with the same design, did not sink.

“… it should be remembered that the FV Gaul and her sister ships were built under Lloyd’s approval, with the same duff and offal chutes design. On the sister ships these chutes survived under similar conditions and were retained until the end of their service.” (Letter from the DfT dated 07.11.06)

The above comments imply that the duff and offal chutes gave satisfactory trouble free service throughout the lives of the sister vessels. A closer look into this matter shows that, in fact, this is not quite the case:

The Gaul had three sister vessels: Arab, Kelt and Kurd. These vessels are still in service, but none is currently working as a trawler.

Available records show:

1. That the Kappin (ex Arab) is currently working as a fish processing factory freezer ship off the Greenland coast.
The Arab was sold in 1983 and converted into a support depot ship for submersibles; in 1984 it was converted back into a stern trawler. The vessel continued to work as a stern trawler until early 2006 when it was converted into a fish factory ship.

A very good photo of this vessel can be viewed at:

http://www.shipspotting.com/modules/myalbum/photo.php?lid=235426

The vessel was visited in 2003, by the retained experts for the RFI for the purposes of obtaining information that could be of use to the Investigation. The vessels crew were also quizzed at that time (ref. Technical paper presented by the retained experts ‘The loss of the MFV Gaul’ - http://www.bctq.com/isleman.html)

“As part of the RFI, a party visited the FV KAPPIN, a sister vessel to GAUL still fishing from the Faroes. Discussion with the crew revealed that flooding of the factory deck was a recurrent problem. This had been dealt with in part by installing deep well pumps and blanking off the forward offal chute. Even so, crew recounted serious flooding incidents as a direct result of water coming through the aft duff chute. Fortunately this was never catastrophic.”

Does this mean that the crew of the Kappin have also been leaving the chute flaps and covers open?

2. That the Bergen Surveyor (ex Kelt) is currently working as a seismic survey vessel for Norwegian owners.

The Kelt was sold in 1982 and initially converted into a support depot ship for submersibles; in 1997 it was converted into a seismic survey vessel.

A very good photo of this vessel can be viewed at:

http://www.shipspotting.com/modules/myalbum/photo.php?lid=63966

It is most likely that the duff and offal chute openings would have been removed at the time of time of its initial conversion in 1982 (support vessels do not need arrangements for the discharge of duff and offal). The picture shows that, in its current guise, the chute openings are no longer present.

3. That the Southern Surveyor (ex Kurd) is currently working as a marine research vessel and is owned by the Australian Government. The factory deck on this vessel has been converted into a laboratory.

The Kurd was sold in 1983 and initially converted into a support depot ship for submersibles; in 1988 it was converted into a research vessel.

A very good photo of this vessel can be viewed at: http://www.marine.csiro.au/nationalfacility/images/1shipside_lge.jpg

It is most likely that the duff and offal chutes would have been removed at the time of its initial conversion in 1983. The picture above shows that, in its current guise, the chute openings are no longer present.

The Formal Investigation

John Prescott (upper) & Justice David Steel (lower)

Attorney Generall- Lord Goldsmith

We will be responding soon to the letter received from the Department for Transport

The Sergeant Schultz Syndrome

I have been in touch with a senior Maritime Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) source, who had been involved in the preparation of the Gaul case prior to the 2004 formal investigation.

Asked whether the MAIB had provided information to the wreck commissioner (i.e justice david steel) in respect of the patent design defect in the construction and arrangement of the duff and offal chutes on the Gaul, he would say neither Yes nor No.

As to the pre-investigation deliberations that had taken place between MAIB and other experts on the subject of the faults in the construction of the chutes he had no clear recollection.
Whilst in other cases the MAIB would collect evidence and provide analysis on the causes and circumstances of a marine accident, in the Gaul case, I am told, the MAIB provided the documentary evidence, but left the government’s retained experts to formulate their own conclusions. The MAIB, my interlocutor said, was in a difficult situation vis-á- vis the Gaul case.

I wonder why.

Questions on answers or How to communicate economically

Sandra Gidley: To ask the Secretary of State for Transport what estimate he has made of the total cost of investigations and inquiries into the loss of the F. V. Gaul in 2006 prices. [96789]

Dr. Ladyman: The total cost to the Department of investigations and inquiries into the loss of the FV Gaul was £6.5 million.

No adjustment has been made for 2006 prices.

Gadfly: Perhaps Dr Ladyman should know that the Original Formal Investigation was concluded in 1974.

There appear to be some items missing from the above list. The total costs to the Department should also have included:

1. the costs of the stability and seakeeping investigations and model tests carried out for the Department by NMI and YARD between 1975 and 1978 estimated at £75,000 (in 1976 prices)

2. the costs of the two reports by Roger Clarke published in 2000. Stated to have cost the Department £50,000 at that time

3. additionally, the costs of 32 years of governmental time that has not been included in the above (political staff, technical, clerical and administrative staff, MOD, legal etc) - £1m at todays prices would not be an unreasonable evaluation!

If a simple compound interest calculation is carried out on the costs detailed above, using historical Bank Rate indices, then a figure of £10m at 2006 prices is obtained!

See also: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/pages/live/articles/columnists/columnists.html?in_article_id=371759&in_page_id=1772&in_author_id=244

Sandra Gidley: To ask the Secretary of State for Transport what progress has been made towards the implementation of the formal safety recommendations arising from the F. V. Gaul Re-opened Formal Investigation. [96790]

Dr. Ladyman: It is considered that, as far as is reasonably practicable, the recommendations have been implemented.

Gadfly: The four formal safety recommendations have not been implemented.

Sandra Gidley: To ask the Secretary of State for Transport whether any evidence of a design fault in the construction and arrangement of the duff and offal chutes on the trawler F. V. Gaul was made available to the Wreck Commissioner during the 2004 investigation. [96794]

Dr. Ladyman: The Marine Accident Investigation Branch provided the inquiry with a copy of a full set of technical drawings for the vessel, a number of which detailed the design of these chutes. These drawings were reviewed by the technical experts and the expert representing the Department for Transport referred to these drawings in the production of the document “Notes on the duff and offal chutes”, submitted to the Re-opened Formal Investigation. These notes included comments on the design of the chutes and the potential design inadequacies.

Gadfly: First of all, the question that had been asked was not answered (i.e. was any evidence of a design fault made available to the Wreck Commissioner?). A yes or no answer would have sufficed.
Secondly, The Marine Accident Investigation Branch would provide, as they normally do and as the Treasury Solicitor recently confessed, “considerable assistance” to the Wreck Commissioner. They would therefore provide much more than a set of old drawings.
Thirdly, the “Notes on the duff and offal chutes”, only commented on a presumed design deficiency in relation to the difficulty of maintenance of the non-return flaps.So, in a couple of sentences, Dr Ladyman implies that either the MAIB performance was poor, or the MAIB witheld evidence, or the retained experts were unable to recognize an obvious design fault in the construction and arrangement of the duff and offal chutes.

***

“When you hear a denial of knowledge or responsibility, rate it carefully on the plausibility scale. The real culprit is usually at the top, as his nose will eventually demonstrate”. (Patrick Brown, 1999, Plausibility and Pinocchio)

Equivocation and other fallacies

The Secretary of State for Transport has provided answers to the Parliamentary questions tabled last week. His answers are both evasive and incorrect.

More about these later...

Aiming but not quite hitting

Our relations with the Government are deteriorating.

We have been trying to extract a comment from the DfT, on the vexed issue of the Gaul investigation, since the 4th of September. Up to this moment, no comment or justification for the lack of it has been offered.

Nevertheless, DfT's statement on their service standards, which is published on their website, reads:

"The Department is always pleased to receive comments about its work. We are happy to answer any queries and supply information about what we do. The services we offer to everyone who contacts us are:

The Department will always try to be helpful.

We will make a note of all comments given to us about our policies, and will make sure they reach the policy officials and Ministers concerned. "

"We aim to reply to emails within 20 working days."