‘Bringing in all the talent’

More often in politics than in life, a trade-off between scruples and convenience is necessary.

Our old friend, Dr Ladyman, is no longer Minister for Transport.

Our new PM, in his quest for talent, found that no one was better qualified to take Dr Ladyman's place than Ms Rosie Winterton, the ex-Minister for Health and Prezza's buddy.

The choice was exceptional: Ms Winterton's vast experience in shipping and transport matters in general is well known. Besides, as a good friend of John Prescott, she will be very keen, I am sure, to sort out all the problems related to the flawed Gaul Investigation and other serious irregularities, which have been inherited by the DfT since the golden age of Prescott's stewardship of the department.

Blessed are those who try to make the best of two worlds!

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UPDATE (5 July 2007): The appointment of a new leading team at DfT gives responsibility for shipping matters to Jim Fitzpatrick MP (Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State).

In the seventies, Mr Fitzpatrick used to be a fireman at the London Fire Brigade, and later he became junior minister at the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, with the role of Minister for London.

Rosie Winterton has been allocated a number of other responsibilities including: Europe, cycling and WALKING (?!) - but not shipping.

As Minister of State, however, Rosie will be atop the Under-Secretaries’ remit.

Mr Fitzpatrick’s fire-fighting experience may, who knows, come in handy again.

Io, Saturnalia

For more than a year we’ve tried to bring repairs to the flaws of the 2004 Gaul Investigation. For more than a year we’ve been confronted with the insincerity, ineptitude and indifference of those called to sort out the case.

A typical manifestation of the Blair era, the final chapter in the Gaul saga was turned from Greek tragedy into a Roman farce.

Io, Saturnalia, said the Romans, to greet the Solstice festival. For seven days a year, they would reverse the social order; revel in lawlessness and mockery. It was a time when gods were scorned and gambling in public was permitted. The jester wore the emperor’s toga and his orders were obeyed no matter how bizarre. This reversal of roles was, however, only temporary and symbolic – the jester was not free to make any binding decisions, and, at the end of the festival, anything he decreed would be revoked.

When Saturnalia ended, the tomfoolery stopped, everybody returned to their long-established values, and the accustomed order was restored.

Can we likewise expect a come back to normality at the end of our ten years long Saturnalia?

I hope so, but I wouldn’t lay a wager on that.

Another mechanical reason

"18.17... it is important to note that although both chutes were found on the wreck to be open both in way of the non-return flap and the internal top cover, there is no known mechanical reason why this was so." (Report of the 2004 Re-opened Formal Investigation into the Loss of the FV Gaul)

In the paper describing the MAIN DESIGN FAULT on the Gaul, we gave an account of how the closed flaps of the duff and offal chutes on the vessel could have been forced open by the sea at the time of the incident. (You can also see a model of the design fault captured on this VIDEO clip).

Furthermore, the factor tree analysis diagram, published earlier on THIS PAGE, presented a range of alternative explanations, as to how the outer flaps of the duff and offal chutes on the Gaul could have become open and remained in the open position (the RFI having only examined and accepted that the flaps were open, prior to the vessel’s departure from Hull, as a result of corrosion and lack of maintenance).

One of these alternative explanations (i.e. THE SECOND DESIGN FAULT), mentioned in an earlier POST, put forward the possibility that the bolted non-return flap assemblies within the chutes could have become twisted due to wave action and remained open as a result.

Today, we are presenting another alternative explanation, whereby a simple dimensioning error in the shipyard’s construction drawings meant that, if ever the brass gland within the flap hinges was loosened by the operation of the flap, parts of it could have bound together, thus causing the flap to remain seized in the open position.

THIS PAPER gives the details.

The goon squads
(A few more words in addition to an earlier POST)

What has the story of a fishing trawler got to do with the EU? I wondered.

Well, the answer could lie in the fact that the disclosure of one of the more fragrant skeletons in the UK government’s cupboard - an EU insider (a foreign national), in a fit of honesty, explained to me – might harm some very highly placed persons and, in a short chain reaction, blight the very top of the Blair administration.

As Tony Blair was so fervently pro-EU, the EU heartland turned passionately pro-Blair.

Like soldier bees defending their queen against incomers who don’t have the correct hive odour, the EU goon squads (oh yes, they do exist) set out to defend the Cause and remove the threat to those chosen by destiny to lead them to the Promised Land.

The Gaul scandal was, therefore, contained. But only for a while…

Meanings

Some of those who have read our previous POST may wonder whether the definitions used in the 2004 Gaul RFI were tailored to suit the conclusions of the investigation or whether they were just an unfortunate mistake that, it so happened, had a serious impact upon the outcome of the inquiry.

We cannot provide an answer in this respect, but we can supply some additional information:

- The definitions for ‘watertight’ and ‘weathertight’ are common knowledge amongst marine professionals, so it would be unreasonable to assume that the panel of experts in the Gaul RFI were not familiar with these classifications.

- Justice David Steel, the Admiralty judge, who conducted the formal investigation into the loss of MV Herald of Free Enterprise (1987), seemed, at the time, to be well aware of the correct meanings of the terms:

“[the term]…Watertight is applied to doors and bulkheads where there is the possibility of water accumulating at either side. Weathertight applies to doors or openings, which are only required to prevent the ingress of water from the side exposed to the weather.”[1]
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[1] David Steel Q.C., mv Herald of Free Enterprise, Report of Court No.8074

Moving the goalposts

In our first POST, dated 31 August 2006 and in the technical paper (pages 15, 26-30) published HERE, we showed how the internationally agreed definitions for ‘watertight’ and ‘weathertight’ (which lay down the required properties for certain ship’s fittings) had been altered in the final report of the 2004 Gaul RFI, by the Investigation panel, in a way that made them looser in requirements and application.

To recap, the RFI definition for ‘watertight’ did not contain the very specific and essential capability of “preventing the passage of water in any direction under a head of water for which the surrounding structure is designed” that the standard definition incorporated, while the definition for ‘weathertight’ replaced the statutory capability that “in any sea conditions water will not penetrate into the vessel” with the less stringent requirement of ”being sealed to exclude water in normal sea conditions”.

Now, you may wonder: why would the RFI panel do such a thing, of creatively re-writing these definitions, rather than simply reproducing the standard ones from the Load Line and other Conventions?

If one looks at this problem in the whole context of the investigation and its outcome, then it becomes apparent that, without these alterations, the findings and the loss scenario that were produced by the investigation panel, would not have held water.

It was only according to these modified definitions that the inner covers of the duff and offal chutes on the Gaul could be categorised as watertight (in reality, these covers were not even of weathertight standard[1]).

Once having wrongly ascribed ‘watertight’ properties to the inner covers, it was then easy to claim, as the 2004 RFI did, that, had these covers been secured in the closed position, the flooding and subsequent loss of the vessel could have been prevented. As the Gaul’s inner covers were found to be open during the underwater survey, the blame for the incident was then immediately placed on the crew, thus avoiding any need for a further proper examination of the faulty outer ‘non-return’ flaps. (See VIDEO clip for a brief demonstration of the design fault)

Hence, we can only infer that: had the RFI panel not assigned properties to the closing arrangements on the duff and offal chutes of the Gaul on the basis of false criteria, they would have had to arrive at the same conclusion as others have: i.e. with the outer non-return flaps properly designed, the vessel would not have sank, regardless of whether the inner covers were open or closed.

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[1] Only in combination with the outer flaps were the inner covers intended to form a weathertight barrier to the sea. The role of the outer flaps was to provide a strength barrier against the force of the waves, and that of the inner covers to simply prevent the leakage.

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After you, Sir

Organisations, like people, have their own memory and moeurs.

Despite the political assaults on the time-honoured institutions of this country, some, it appears, have not been completely transformed.

This looks to be the case with Lloyd’s Register of Shipping (although nowadays their declared purpose of existence is the management of risk, as opposed to their past aims of simply improving ships’ safety).

Demonstrating that institutional history is a better guide than our government’s agenda, LRS have chosen, it seems, to recall and stick to their original virtues and integrity, and, in response to our recent enquiry about the Gaul, have sent us the following message:

Dear ******

Thank you for your email and explaining your position. The legal enquiry is complete on the Gaul and information passed to the MCA. It will be Lloyd's Register's intention to work with them should they decide to take this further. If the MCA or other official body contract you to study this and request Lloyd's Register to assist, then we will be happy to participate in such a study, but not before.

I wish you success with your research.

Yours sincerely,

*************

Marine Director

Lloyd's Register

This answer doesn’t sound, at all, like a statement of faith on the merits of the 2004 RFI. Does it?

Now, the final say in the Gaul saga rests with our Secretary of State for Transport, who, so far, has been rather non-committal.

However, once he realises that somebody straddling the fence is not going to get very far in either direction, he will have to take, we hope, the appropriate decision.

Because Lloyd’s Register have just said: After you, Sir!

Compliance with the rules (Part II)

In our previous post we indicated several non-compliances with the safety rules pertaining to the construction of the Gaul’s duff and offal chutes.

We are now reporting on further non-compliances with the rules, details of which have been published within this LINKED DOCUMENT.

Compliance with the rules (Part I)

In the email received from Lloyd’s Register of Shipping on 29 May 2007, it was stated that that the FV Gaul had been built in accordance with Class and statutory requirements.
Similarly, the final report of the Gaul 2004 RFI, states on page 10 that the vessel was “built to Lloyd’s Register of Shipping classification +100 A1 (Stern Trawler), Ice Class III for the hull.” In their letter dated 7 November 2006, the Department for Transport (DfT) also confirmed that ”the FV Gaul and her sister ships were built under Lloyd’s approval”.

Prompted by these remarks and as promised in an earlier post, we have decided to set out the reasons why these assertions are not wholly correct. These and further clarifications in this respect have been published on this PAGE

Electronic correspondence with Lloyd's Register of Shipping

On 24 May 2007 the following email was sent to the CEO designate of Lloyd's Register:

Dear Mr *********,

I am writing to you on the subject of the 2004 Re-opened Formal Investigation into the sinking of the trawler Gaul.

I would be very interested in your opinion on the research papers, critical comments and disclosures that have recently been published on the following sites:

http://www.freewebs.com/inconvenientcitizen and

http://the-trawler-gaul.blogspot.com

As your staff appear to have visited the above web pages, I assume that LR has already formed an opinion on this rather controversial subject - opinion which, I hope, you may be willing to share with us.

Moreover, as LR is the society that classed the vessel and also had one of its principal surveyors appointed as assessor in the 2004 RFI, your input could be very informative.

Looking forward to your reply, I thank you in advance.

Yours sincerely,

********

The above email and the rest of the exchange is published at this LINK; the final answer, though, is still pending.

OBS.> The LRS claim that the chutes on the Gaul were "constructed in accordance with class and statutory requirements" is incorrect. We will explain more about this in the near future.

The puzzle tour

We have often asked ourselves why such an obvious fault in the design of the Gaul had escaped the attention of scores of technical experts and assessors during years of legal battles and official scrutiny.
Why was this fault not noticed when the drawings were examined, immediately after the loss of the vessel?

Is it really possible that the design fault was, in fact, noticed?

Is it possible that the 2002 discovery of the design fault in the duff and offal chutes was, in fact, a re-discovery?

The labyrinthine trail of the Gaul’s history has eventually lead us back to the autumn of 1977 when, probably for the first time, the possibility of a problem with the chutes on the Gaul, as a likely cause for the loss of the vessel, was recorded. In a memo dated 14 September 1977, the Surveyor General in the Department of Trade (DOT) wrote:

“ It would indeed be a bonus if we not only located the GAUL but also established the cause of the loss. However, most evidence points to the GAUL being an intact ship, so we can give little guidance as to damage and I would expect small openings[1] which may have allowed the entry of water to the factory deck to be indetectable. The soundings also indicate the wreck which we suspect is the GAUL, is lying on its side…” Source RFI formal report paragraph 8.25

On 22 December 1977, the NMI released the report of their DOT-sponsored research into the sea-keeping and stability characteristics of the Gaul. These findings refuted the conclusions of the 1974 Formal Investigation by establishing that flooding of the factory deck would have been a precondition for the vessel’s capsize.

In a strange twist of logic, the results of the NMI research were subsequently interpreted as clearing the vessel’s builders and designers of any responsibility and, thus, the case[2] against them was dropped. In the whole maze of tangle and misdirection, this was probably a significant point. A supreme example of slothful induction, the decision implied that a design fault on the vessel could have only been contemplated if the capsize and sinking had been caused by water accumulated on the trawl deck - that is water accumulated on the factory deck could not have been put down to a design fault or construction error, but only to crew action or inaction. (?!)

During the 30 years of floundering and confusion that followed, no one managed to reach the centre of this circular labyrinth – the place where, as the legend has it, you will probably find a monster.

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[1] There were only two “small openings” capable of admitting water to the factory deck that would be undetectable if the vessel was lying on its starboard side: the duff and offal chute openings.

[2] In February 1997, a writ alleging negligence had been issued against the Gaul’s owners and its designers/ builders, Brooke Marine shipyard, by the families of the crew.

The loss of decency

I’ve just found out that the author of the controversial research papers on the Gaul RFI, published on these pages, has again been threatened by a politically regimented civil servant/ vigilante/informer camped within a government agency.

Allusions to our source’s job security and pension were made. The message was clear: you either shut up, or you will be sorry.
(This must be an improvement, we thought, considering the death threats previously received and the other more serious abuses that had been committed.)

How sad the place where the political loyalty of placemen and informers is a substitute for professional competence and integrity, and where the government of the day places itself outside the reach of the law.

Putting things straight

Now and then

In 1976 the UK National Maritime Institute completed a model of the MFV Gaul. The subsequent model tests and associated research took more than two years. The model was operated in the towing tank at NMI Feltham and then tested in real sea conditions, in Christchurch Bay.

PHOTO ALBUM

The NMI conclusions, set out in their report of 1978, confirmed that: in the intact condition the stability of the mv Gaul was adequate. The stability of the vessel would be reduced to a dangerous level only when the factory deck was in a partially flooded condition.

(Anybody interested in viewing the official records of this research, can view the original clip HERE)

Prior to the 2004 Re-opened Formal Investigation, the Marine Research Institute of Netherlands was contracted to build a new model of the Gaul and test its survivability under various parameters. This model was afterwards tested in a water tank that simulated the waves and winds on a proportional scale. MARIN also carried out a FREDYN time domain computer simulation of the vessel’s behaviour in various operational and environmental conditions.

PHOTO ALBUM (click NEXT on the right panel)

The results of the 2003 MARIN model tests confirmed that: rapid accumulation of water on the factory deck would sink the vessel.

(Anybody interested in viewing the official records of this research, can view one of the original clips HERE)

Decoy ducks and submarines

Lies and secrecy provide a fertile soil from which myths are born. A lot of mystery and speculation has, therefore, surrounded the loss of the trawler Gaul.

Stories like those about the vessel having been sunk by a submarine or captured by the Russians are still inflaming many imaginations, granting the Gaul tragedy a more dramatic and mysterious twist.

These myths also serve the present oligarchs well: they deflect from an embarrassing truth, offer an alternative to the disputed results of the RFI, but do not bear financial implications. (In this way, the families can have their fair share of discontent, but cannot sue for compensation because the evidence is not there.)

The design defect identified as the most likely cause for the loss of the Gaul, on the other hand, could prove more costly, meaning that several institutions might become liable for substantial compensation to the families of the victims.

The Gaul 'sunk by a submarine' story – based on some tattle somebody overheard in a cafeteria – was therefore taken very seriously by the 2004 RFI panel; so seriously, in fact, that the proceedings were re-started to hear the gossip.

(I don’t say that fishermen never got entangled in matters of espionage or warfare, or that vessels were never lost due to submarines. What I mean is that there is no factual evidence that this was the case with the Gaul.)

To keep the myths going and deflect attention from concrete technical matters, a number of rumour merchants - turned decoy ducks, Internet trolls and salaried opinion formers, knowingly or not, are now in the business of using these spectacular scenarios as ‘red herrings’ to counter the emerging facts.
Thus, each time some factual evidence comes out, the submarine also pops back up to the surface and each time the design defect is invoked, the Russian spies rear their heads again.

More about the main design fault on the Gaul

In an earlier posting we gave details of the main design fault that was present in the closing arrangements for the duff and offal chute openings on the Gaul (i.e. that that non-return flap plates opened the wrong way). In that posting we suggested that, if for any reason the flap valve was not fully closed, it could be opened by the action of the sea.

In fact, those comments did not reveal the full extent of the problem; the design of the flap valve was such that even if the valve had been in the fully closed position, the forces of the sea could have opened it.

Furthermore, this is not a just a hypothetical scenario, the partial print from one of the Gaul’s drawings (below), shows that there was a lip or ‘free edge’ at the end of the flap for the sea to act on.

And the VIDEO CLIP in our previous post shows in graphic detail just how easy it would have been for this “non-return” flap valve to open and for the seawater to flood into the factory deck of the vessel.

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If the above link does not work, please try HERE

Back garden model testing

At the end of the 2004 RFI, the wreck commissioner opined: “[…] it is important to note that although both chutes were found on the wreck to be open both in way of the non-return flap and the internal top cover, there is no known mechanical reason why this was so.” [1]

This viewpoint has recently been echoed by the the Treasury Solicitor who said: “there was no evidence that the chutes had been forced open by wave or water action so this was not advanced as a loss scenario by the experts”

Having enjoyed the benefits of a sunny weekend, we decided to construct a small-scale (and cheap) model of the chutes and test them with a hose. The results of this simple experiment provide a clear illustration of the SCENARIO whereby the design fault in the duff and offal chutes on the Gaul caused the flooding and loss of the vessel.

Simple mechanics!

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[1] Report of the Re-opened Formal Investigation into the Loss of the FV Gaul

Back garden modelling of the Gaul chutes
Uploaded by gadflymotion531

The video file can be dowloaded from this SITE (2.9 Mb)

At the centre of the web

Following on from our previous post, regarding our request for the two RFI papers kept in the DfT vaults, we can now inform you that we eventually had to go back to the Treasury Solicitor to find out whether he was ready to provide the DfT with the coordinates of the documents in question.

“All roads lead to Rome”, a proverb says; similarly, in the Gaul RFI case, all roads lead to the TSol - to the Attorney General, in fact, as the Treasury Solicitor is just the front desk of that milliarium aureum to which all related questions are referred and from which all governmental responses seem to radiate.
As the Romans designed their radial network of roads with the purpose of preventing provinces getting together and organising resistance against the Empire, so has the Attorney General’s office placed itself at the centre of things in the Gaul inquiry. No request for information or inspection of the government’s chronicles is therefore possible without going through his nodal office first.
As a result, the TSol is now in the position to decree that not all documents in a public inquiry are public, and that these cannot be released without the agreement of the wreck commissioner, of the RFI retained experts[1] (all of whom cannot be contacted directly) and, ultimately, of the Attorney General, himself.

This “all roads lead to Rome” approach seems beneficial and expedient for the moment; however, the downside of this is, as it was for the Romans, that retaliating forces can also take these direct routes and reach the centre - just as quickly.
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[1] The RFI retained experts were paid significant sums of money from the public purse; whatever they produced should therefore be available for public scrutiny.

The hot-potato game

In our post of 17 March, we reported on our attempts to obtain two documents held by the Department for Transport (DfT), which are mentioned in the Gaul RFI EXPERTS' PROTOCOL (paragraphs 3, 8 and 9) and which, frankly, should have been published within the final report (as was the case in the MV Derbyshire RFI).
Having failed to lodge a request for these papers via the parliamentary route, on 19 March, I sent THIS EMAIL to the DfT.

Since then, we have managed to obtain a copy of the first document (i.e. the list of “all” possible scenarios for the loss of the Gaul) from the MAIB. (This list looks quite interesting and we intend to comment on it separately, in due course.)

The second document that we would like to obtain, (i.e. the joint report, which gives details of the RFI experts’ consideration of the various loss scenarios that had been put forward during the investigation), the DfT is still not able to provide.

Chased up on this matter, the head of Shipping Policy 4, not too thrilled to hear from us again, said that the Department was now depleted of staff with intimate knowledge of the Gaul affair, so he had had to refer our request to the Treasury Solicitor. The latter, we were told, is now the only person left at the scene, able to guide the DfT in their search for the document in question.

I hope that the joint report – central piece of the £10m investigation - has not been misplaced or mislaid…

As I write these lines I am touching wood.

The list with the main protagonists in the Gaul RFI has been published HERE.

‘Prejudice with a halo’

The RFI into the sinking of the FV Gaul, after many months spent looking at the available evidence, including the results of the 2002 underwater survey, concluded at the end of 2004 that the loss of the vessel had been caused by crew and shore staff negligence. (Obs.)

Yet, five years earlier, in 1999, John Prescott, in a flash of visionary prescience, had already anticipated its results: ”Returning to the Gaul and the Derbyshire, I don't want to prejudge the formal investigation. Indeed, I must not.” our Deputy Prime Minister said humbly; “But already the signs are that the water integrity of the vessels may have been breached, not only by the weather, but also by inadequate attention to good seafaring practice.” he, nevertheless, pressed on.

John Prescott’s statement was later condemned by the International Transport Workers' Federation, who argued that: “It is too early to say what the cause was”. [1]

The Deputy PM was subsequently proven wrong in the Derbyshire case, and as to the Gaul…
Moral: for a visionary to stay in business, his visions should, occasionally, come true.

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[1] Source of information: ‘Casualties: Poor seamanship may have caused Derbyshire loss’, David Osler, Lloyd’s List, 6 July 1999

Implausible deniability

When one of their scam operations shows signs of going wrong, our government applies what in the gangsters’ underworld is known as the kite strategy: i.e. when a kite gets caught in a tree, the handler cuts the strings. Or, otherwise said, when the operation fails, the smallest guys are left to do the explaining.

Fortunately for the potential kites in the Gaul RFI case, the above-mentioned strategy is not going to be tenable.

More will follow…

A few essential details that went missing

In any major and costly marine accident investigation, such as the Gaul RFI, one would normally expect lots of data and information relevant to the identified cause of the tragedy to emerge and be made available.
Yet, looking at the government website: www.fv-gaul.org.uk, the sole repository of official information on the Gaul case, one cannot help wondering why so little was published about those things that were pertinent and central to the loss of the vessel, while many tangential issues were generously treated.
Anyway, to make up for the government’s oversight, we have taken it upon ourselves to publish some ADDITIONAL DATA from the vessel’s design plans together with a few detail views of the duff and offal chutes on the Gaul.
These diagrams, apart from adding clarity to the general arrangements on the Gaul and the construction of its chutes, also show that the RFI panel’s claim, that maintenance of the Gaul’s flap assemblies was not possible, is clearly not correct. [This latter aspect has, in fact, already been covered in the full TECHNICAL REPORT.]

‘Shopping’ the Government

When an omnipotent government commits what appear to be serious transgressions, where do you go to?
In a healthy society there would be plenty of alert and redress mechanisms available: parliament, select committees, government watchdogs, the judiciary, the media etc., able to wag their fingers at the transgressors and say that enough is enough.

In our case, by contrast, after having unsuccessfully tried these less drastic routes first, we had no option but to pack it all in and call the Police.

The Police have specific methods of inquiry, way beyond our abilities, and corrective powers, which are not available to us.They are also, we suspect, better equipped than us to withstand any likely government counterblasts.

Therefore, we have referred the matter of the flawed Gaul Investigation and its ‘spin-offs’ to their authority.

(For this reason we will now delay publishing the rest of the Gaul-related evidence that we have in our possession.)

We will, however, continue to inform you on the developments

When history repeats itself

In an article published in Lloyd’s List, almost 13 years ago[1], John Spruyt, was reflecting on the possible winners and losers of another well-known sea tragedy: the sinking of the MV Derbyshire in 1980, which cost the lives of 44 seafarers.
Having read his article, we could not help drawing an analogy between the Derbyshire and the Gaul cases.

We’ve heard it often said that history repeats itself because no one was listening the first time and that a wrong, if not rectified, only increases. Looking back at the unfortunate similarities and differences between the ways in which these accidents have been investigated, these apothegms seem very true, indeed.

In the Derbyshire case, the 1987 formal investigation reached its conclusion “without any factual evidence”, refusing “to take into account earlier research on behalf of the DoT[2] into the possibility of structural failure as the cause of bulker tragedies[3]”, and invoking a force majeure event as the cause for the loss of the vessel and her crew[4].

At the time when John Spruyt’s article was published, the Derbyshire case had not reached its final act, and the re-opening of the formal investigation had not yet taken place.[5]

It was in that context that the author of the article was considering the impact of a re-examination of the case: “[the re-opening of the investigation] would, if it confirmed the frame 65 hypothesis, create a new selection of losers from the [Derbyshire] tragedy”; apart from the primary ones: the victims and their families together with the owners of the vessel and their insurers, a new class of losers could emerge, which could include, we were told, the original formal inquiry team, the secretary of state who convened it and, ultimately, the taxpayer on behalf of the shipbuilders who had been privatised and passed over their liabilities to the government.
The Classification Society who certified the vessel and the ship designers might also get caught in the line of fire, the warning went on. Does this sound familiar?

Unlike the Derbyshire case, however, which was ultimately re-examined, the chance of re-re-opening the Gaul investigation has been, sadly, complicated by the subsequent cover-ups and cover-ups of the cover-ups, which have constantly added new groups and prominent figures to the class of potential losers.
In such circumstances, a re-opening of the Gaul investigation could taint the credentials of some quite reputable organisations and discredit parts of our legal system and of the civil service etc.– institutions once independent, but which are now tied in to the political food chain.

Consequently, very few have an appetite now for pursuing the truth in the Gaul case. If that were to happen, it is feared, it would not only bring to light a previous miscarriage of justice, but it may also unravel a series of other unpalatable facts - some with potentially criminal implications.

Another difference between the Derbyshire case and the Gaul, this time working in favour of the latter, is that the design and arrangement of the duff and offal chutes on the Gaul, which were the most likely cause for the loss of the vessel, can be more definitively categorised as a design defect rather than a mere design weakness, as the design and construction of the hatches on MV Derbyshire was described during the 2000 inquiry.

Thus, while in the Derbyshire case, suing for compensation (after the RFI) might have required some legal mastery on the part of any legal team appointed by the bereaved families, establishing negligence and culpability, in the Gaul tragedy, should be a lot more clear-cut.
Nonetheless, or perhaps for this reason also, there is yet another difference between the two histories: since the publication of John Spruyt’s article, the Derbyshire investigation has been re-opened and has reached a more or less satisfactory conclusion, whereas the Gaul families are still being denied justice.

Bearing all these factors in mind, we fully concur with the author of the article when he argues that: “a few more apparent losers will be worth the lessons to be learned and may, who knows, help to prevent further loss of ships and life.”
We equally agree with the conclusion of the article that the re-opening of a previously failed investigation could serve as a long overdue “time of catharsis in which violent forces do injury to some of the players, so that reconciliation can pave the way to a benign end” that, we would add, could then allow trust in the roles and effectiveness of the ‘system’ to be rebuilt.
And thus, let us hope, justice to the families of the Gaul victims would be finally delivered, helping them to forgive and forget.

(For more comments on the 2004 Gaul RFI please see the FULL TECHNICAL REPORT)

[1] Winners and losers in the five-act ‘Derbyshire’ tragedy, Lloyd’s List, September 26, 1994

[2] Department of Transport
[3] Comment attributed to the ITF (International Transport Federation)
[4] Later on, the accident assessors stated that the loss of MV Derbyshire had been caused by crew negligence leading to structural failure, but the 2000 RFI eventually absolved the crew of any responsibility by concluding that the ship had sunk due to structural failure and as a result of inadequacies in the legislation in force at the time of build.
[5] We wish to emphasize that the parallel we are drawing here is between the 1987 Derbyshire FI and the 2004 Gaul RFI. The Derbyshire investigation was eventually re-opened in April 2000.

Inconsistencies

On the rare occasions when we managed to get a reaction from them, the UK Marine Accident Investigation Branch claimed, hand on heart, that their investigators role in the Gaul RFI had been limited to the mere provision of the underwater survey video footage and technical drawings. The MAIB did nothing more than “act as agents” “leaving the retained experts in the formal investigation to draw their own conclusions” as to the causes of the accident. This version of events was also backed by Dr Stephen Ladyman, the Transport Minister, in his response to a parliamentary question.

However, Para 3 of the Experts’ Protocol in the Gaul Re-Opened Formal Investigation, which was drawn up in October 2002 and annexed to the 2004 RFI final report, states a rather different thing: “A list of all possible scenarios has previously been drawn up by MAIB in consultation with the families’ experts which should form the basis for further work.” This somehow appears to contradict the MAIB’s non-interference claims.

Anxious to solve this inconsistency, we have requested both the MAIB and the Department for Transport that a copy of this list be made available to us. In reply to our request, the MAIB sent us this email. From DfT we haven’t heard anything yet – nothing, except the sound of steps scurrying away from the torchlight.

The Fraud Act

(Crown copyright)

Selections from the contents of the FRAUD ACT can be viewed on THIS PAGE.

"It's increasingly difficult to get straight answers to straight questions" Sandra Gidley

On 11 February 2007, we asked our local MP (Mrs Sandra Gidley) to make two requests for information via the Parliamentary procedure.These requests were to enable us to obtain two documents, held by the government, which would have shed further light on the procedural aspects of the Gaul Formal Investigation.

In the next few days, we will also reveal what these interesting documents are about.

During our last meeting with our MP, on 10 March 2007, we learned, however, that these requests could not be addressed via the Parliament, but by means of a future letter from Mrs Gidley to the Department for Transport – a course of action, which, she believed, would be easier and more appropriate.

OK! Let’s hope that it works, though I have a feeling that it may not.

2002 Underwater Survey

'Secret Agents'

In 2002 the MAIB carried out an underwater survey of the wreck of the Gaul and produced over 3,000 hours of high quality video footage.
The survey vessel used, MPSV Seisranger, was equipped with nine Remotely Operated Vehicles (ROVs), including several mini-ROVs. The cost for this operation, as the Transport minister advised, amounted to about £3 million.

During the 2004 Re-opened Formal Investigation parts of this video footage were examined by the retained experts and a few selections from this material were afterwards attached to the RFI final report as evidentiary material and placed in the public domain – the coverage of the duff and offal chutes themselves, the very cause of the sinking, representing only a minuscule part of these selections (approx. 64 seconds).

Wishing to obtain some of the missing sections in digital format, so we can publish them more easily, we asked the MAIB to release parts of the footage that were not in the public domain.
In reply to our request, the Chief Inspector of Marine Accidents sent us the following statement:

“MAIB was only acting as an agent in the 2002 Gaul survey, so does not hold any copy of the videos taken.

I am sorry that we cannot assist further”

So, then, the MAIB were acting as agents in the Gaul formal Investigation.

What kind of agents would that be?

Don’t mess with the mob

Do you remember this post? It reproduced a communication between several government experts who had been involved in the Gaul case prior to the RFI.


Three of those mentioned in the original document subsequently left the UK and were employed in a EU institution.
(A similar trajectory was given also to a high-ranking civil servant in the Department for Transport, who had been privy to the various proceedings prior to the RFI)
The author of the critical paper on the Gaul Investigation, published on our sites, was himself amongst those sucked into the EU orbit. That is until 2006, when he managed to extricate himself from that situation and, literally, run back to the UK, the EU mob squealing behind: “We need Tony Blair!”, “We need Tony Blair!”, “We need…”
The EU hub, I am informed, is not the safest place to be when you are sticking your nose into TOPICS that could embarrass the present government.

How odd!

(To be continued)

Cherry-picking

After a suitable delay, Laurance O’Dea, the Treasury Solicitor, emailed a reply to our oft-repeated enquiry regarding the missing evidence in the Gaul investigation.

In his response, dated 23.02.2007, Mr O’Dea again sought to dispel our concerns about the soundness of the investigation, this time by assuring us that the retained experts in the RFI “were able to consider the various drawings of the vessel, including the arrangements of the duff and offal chutes before the public hearings”, that “these experts had been instructed to make their own judgments on the evidence that they were able to see” and that they were “independent and reached conclusions on the evidence available to them”.

Fair enough, so far, but what we actually wanted to know, though, was whether the evidence available to those experts included any mention of the design fault that the specialists from MCA and MAIB had discussed and agreed upon some time ago. Was this evidence contained in the bundle that ‘they were able to see’? We still haven’t got an answer to this question.

“The evidence presented to the Inquiry, and accepted by the Wreck Commissioner was that the chutes were not secured and that water was able to find its way onto the factory deck” and “there was very strong evidence from the survey that the chutes were open and not secured at the time of the loss” the missive further explains.

Up to this point, we agree with the Treasury Solicitor. But then he goes on to say that “there was no evidence[1] that the chutes had been forced open by wave or water action so this was not advanced as a loss scenario by the experts”

Pardon? But, we have already demonstrated that there was enough evidence, which, in legal terms, is called ‘scientific evidence’ – i.e. deduced from well-recognized scientific principles –that supported this loss scenario.

The fact that the chutes were found open at the time of the underwater survey means just that. It does not tell us when or how they had become open. And it certainly does not reveal that they had been open for some time before the incident[2]

To assume otherwise is simply jumping to conclusions.

We don’t know how the retained experts made their judgements; we fear, however, that the evidence that was placed before them was selected in a way that rather ‘counted the hits and overlooked the misses’.
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[1] We would also like to point out that there was no concrete evidence to back the RFI’s conclusion that the non-return flaps had seized in the open position due to corrosion. In our post of January 30, we also showed that, in fact, there was evidence to the contrary.
(Note: the RFI relied heavily on the testimony of a former DOT surveyor who had carried out a survey on an older Gaul sister vessel. He had found that the flaps on that vessel were open and stated that they were rustbound and frozen. Had he been questioned further on this issue, the court would have learned that, whilst the flaps may have been found to be open, it was only an assumption on his part that this had been due to corrosion. The hinges that were assumed to have corroded were not in fact visible to the naked eye and, in order to establish whether corrosion had occurred or not, it would have been necessary to dismantle the flap assemblies).

[2] For further details on these issues you can revisit our previous posts and the factor tree diagram.

Loose ends

In the his opening speech to the Gaul Re-opened Formal Investigation, Nigel Meeson QC, representing the Attorney General, advised on one of the matters on which the RFI should focus:

“…the duff chute …This time a single flap lid, which we can see, is in the open position. It is difficult to see, but if one looks carefully you can see that the chute here is kept in the open position by a wire pinned across the top left-hand corner, which I am indicating now with the laser pen.”
This matter was to become one of the RFI’s principal justifications for concluding that the inner covers of the duff and offal chutes on the Gaul had been secured open by the crew, a fact that was subsequently deemed to have contributed to the loss of the vessel. [1]

The image, taken during the 2002 underwater survey, that Mr Meeson referred to, purportedly shows a wire going across the inner lid.

We have also viewed this picture, as well as the rest of the video footage, and have come to a different conclusion, which we now present in this DOCUMENT.

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[1] The RFI also found that the fact that the outer flaps were found open had been due to corrosion and lack of maintenance. Please see our earlier posts on this issue.

http://petitions.pm.gov.uk/marine-accidents/

Rule 42*

There is that nagging question regarding the elusive evidence of a design defect on the Gaul, that does not go away.
The Secretary of State for Transport, Dr Stephen Ladyman, has twice been quizzed about this evidence through written Parliamentary Questions (PQ).
It was to no avail. The first time he managed to prevaricate and, the second time, he referred us to his previous answer.
We believe that, the second time round, he would have had a harder time fending off the issue, had not the question been changed in transit.

When asked why they had altered the query, the Parliamentary table office advised: “the question as drafted conveyed information tantamount to the advancing of argument”, that is: “it sought to convey information and make an argument” and, therefore, contravened the PQ rules. Besides, a question cannot be asked twice; we were explained, “even if introducing greater levels of detail”.

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* “Rule Forty-two […] that’s not a regular rule: you invented it just now” said Alice.
“It’s the oldest rule in the book,” said the King.
“Then it ought to be Number One,” said Alice.
(Lewis Carroll, Alice in Wonderland)

Opéra féerie

Synopsis

Two weeks ago, the Treasury Solicitor, Laurence O’Dea, promised us a reply to our enquiry regarding the-evidence-that-no-one-dares-mention-in-polite-company.
Having not received an answer from Mr O’Dea in the “early course”, we telephoned about the reasons for this delay. (He had had, after all, at least four months to ponder on this quandary.)

Thus, we managed to find out that what had been holding Mr O’Dea up, this time round, was the need to ‘consult the Department for Transport’ before committing himself in writing.

So, we surmised, the Treasury Solicitor’s recollections about the evidence in the Gaul investigation, which he himself had been charged to pull together during the RFI (*), depended on advice from the DfT.
Once this advice is received, he will be able to add his legal ornaments to it and send us a reply.
However, he indicated, we shouldn’t expect a clear-cut answer to our question, but simply another version of the same old song.

……………………………………………………………………………………………….

(*) During the Re-opened Formal Investigation, the Treasury Solicitor, who works for the Attorney General, on whose behalf the inquiry was conducted, is responsible for the collection of all evidence related to the case and for handing it over to an independent technical expert, also appointed by the Attorney General.

The independent technical expert must then insure that all relevant technical evidence is presented to the RFI.

However, the Treasury Solicitor’s main role as provider of advice and legal representation to government departments introduces, we think, a fundamental inconsistency in a process designed to establish the truth, but where the inflow of information is controlled by a party with a possible vested interest.

8 February - 33 years

The story of the Gaul "is not just about the loss of a fishing trawler and 36 men." It is also about "the incalculable harm to people that comes from inappropriate official actions."(*)

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(*)Bert Wyatt, The First Casualty, 2005

Investigation on behalf of the Attorney General

Body language

While waiting for an answer to our question about the ‘missing evidence’ (which, between us being said, was somewhat rhetorical), we decided to address another query to justice David Steel:

What recommendations, advice or expression of expectations regarding the Gaul case did the Attorney General and the DPM, John Prescott, offer you before and during the 2004 Formal Investigation?

© Crown copyright 2004

Another small observation

The 2004 Formal Investigation into the sinking of the FV Gaul concluded, as we all know by now, that the cause for the loss of the vessel was the ingress of a large quantity of seawater through the two duff and offal chutes openings in the hull of the vessel.
The double-barrier protections of these openings – the inner covers and the outer flaps - were found to be in the open position during the underwater survey in 2002.
The fact that the outer flaps were found open, the investigation concluded, was due to seizure caused by corrosion in the vessel’s 16 month old flap hinges and failure on the part of the crew and shore maintenance staff to identify and rectify this problem.
The fact that the inner covers were also found open was explained away by crew negligence. However, the trouble with these findings (as we have attempted to explain in our earlier posts) is that they were based on unsubstantiated assumptions.

Let’s take, this time, the presumed corrosion at the flap hinges. (For a few more details on this issue please click HERE.)
As the same combination of materials, mild steel and brass, had been used in a number of other structures on the Gaul (e.g. for the toggles and clips on all weathertight hatches and doors), one would expect similar corrosion problems in those areas.
In reality, though, this doesn’t seem to be the case.
Quite the reverse, as the following clips[1] show, even after 28 years under the sea, the toggles and clips on the Gaul did not present such a level of corrosion and seizure that would prevent them from being easily unscrewed by the ROV[2] arm.

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[1] Extracts from the 2002 MAIB video footage - © Crown copyright
[2] Remote Operated Vehicle

weathertight hatch mild-steel clips & brass bush

weathertight hatch brass toggle & steel toggle bolt


weathertight hatch brass toggle & steel toggle bolt

Institutional Independence

The smell of fish and bilge water

In the period between 17 and 24 January, two emails were sent to justice David Steel (the Chief of the 2004 Re-opened Formal Investigation into the sinking of the FV Gaul) and two emails were received from the judge's office in reply.

These items of correspondence were concerned with the very same question that had not quite made it to the Parliament Question Book earlier this year, and which was now addressed to the judge:
Was any evidence of design inadequacies in the construction and arrangements of the duff and offal chutes on the Gaul, specifically relating to:
a. The non-return flaps and their possibility of malfunction (i.e. to open under the action of the sea)
b. The strength of the inner covers when subjected to direct sea loading,

presented to you prior to the publication of your final report on the Investigation on 17 December 2004?"

A simple ‘yes' or ‘no’ from the judge, who acted as solicitor on behalf of the Insurers back in 1978, then as Chief of the Investigation in 2004 and was therefore in the best position to know the answer, would have sufficed.

Sadly, however, we were not meant to get either.

A new article entitled: "Ministers face quiz over Gaul" was published today in the Yorkshire Post.

Let's hope that the Labour MP for Hull East had time to read it.

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and another one: "Call to reopen Gaul Inquiry" appeared in Hull Daily Mail

BRIEF INTRODUCTION

SUMMARY OF THE GAUL CASE AND ITS RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

The third round of Parliamentary Questions and Answers - part 2

‘Attention to detail’

The fourth parliamentary question that was addressed to the Secretary of State for Transport concerned the mode and date of implementation of the four safety recommendations arising from the F. V. Gaul Re-opened Formal Investigation.

The Minister’s latest response to this question was very eloquent and reassuring, but, alas, it was also factually incorrect and misleading. The four formal safety recommendations from the RFI have not as yet been implemented and, had it not been for this recent enquiry, it is unlikely that they would have ever been tackled.

One of the principle faults with the Minister’s response, however, is the fact that he seemed to have opened the RFI Report at the wrong page… (!!) that is, he has copied and responded to text from page 280 of the Report, which does not in fact contain the four formal safety recommendations - these are actually detailed on pages 286 and 287 of the formal document.

To assist matters we have reproduced the four safety recommendations together with our further comments on the Minister’s response at this LINK.

The third round of Parliamentary Questions and Answers - part 1

8 January 2007

“I’ve got my mind made up so don’t confuse me with the facts!”

In December last year the Lib Dem MP for Romsey, Sandra Gidley, tabled another set of questions to Parliament. These were meant to shed some light on the vexed issues of the Gaul, which, after previous parliamentary enquiries, still remained unclear.

Sandra Gidley’s requests for information, received by the tabling office on 19 December 2006, subsequently morphed into a slightly different set of questions and were answered by the minister for transport on the 8th of January. (The document published HERE shows both versions as well as the ministerial answers.)

If we compare the last question on the Gaul, submitted to the tabling office in December, with its published version [113499], we cannot help noticing that the formerly closed, narrowly drawn question, meant to elicit an unambiguous 'yes or no' reply, turned into an open-ended inquiry, which allowed the minister enough “wriggle room” to answer as he pleased and keep control of the flow of information. The change of wording from “whether any evidence of design inadequacies, in the construction and arrangements of the duff and offal chutes on the Gaul, relating to: a. The non-return flaps and their possibility of malfunction (i.e. to open under the action of the sea) b. The strength of the inner covers when subjected to direct sea loading, was made available to the Wreck Commissioner...” to “what evidence of design inadequacies in the construction and arrangements of the duff and offal chutes on the Gaul was made available to the wreck commissioner” enabled the minister to get easily off the hook.

The WHAT questions, as any sales professional will be able to confirm, notoriously invite digression.

We must, however, admit that, although open-ended, the question was a lot better than the answer we got. In his reply, Dr Stephen Ladyman kept to the official line and offered nothing extra to what he had stated before. (see the Parliamentary Questions and Answers of 25 October 2006 and 1 November 2006)

And the answer, my friend, is still blowin’ in the wind.