Saturday, February 26, 2011

FV Trident - Design faults


The FV Trident had significant deficiencies in her stability reserves that remained unresolved from the time she was delivered in 1973 until she capsized in 1974. This factor has been glossed over in the Sheriff’s final RFI report published this week.

The Trident should have been designed and built to meet the requirements of the building specification and contract. This contract, amongst other things, stipulated that the Trident should satisfy the IMCO recommended minimum standard for intact stability (this criterion within the build contract had been included as a pre-condition to significant Governmental grant aid towards Trident’s building costs – an important issue at that time and part of an initiative to try and improve the fishing industry’s appalling safety record)

Unfortunately, upon completion of building, the Trident sailed from the builder's yard without undergoing an inclining experiment and the actual status of her stability reserves, vis-à-vis compliance with the IMCO minimum stability standard, remained a factor that was ignored until a detailed investigation into her actual stability reserves was carried out following her loss.

Subsequent stability calculations during 1975-8 and within the past decade have all indicated that Trident did not meet her contractual stability standard. The findings contained within the 2011 RFI report have now also confirmed that this was indeed the case:

A statement by the Sheriff Principal on this particular issue is contained in Para [46]:

I have already discussed the significance of the fact that, as designed and built, the Trident did not comply fully with the IMCO recommended criteria.

An indication of just how serious this stability shortfall was may be gleaned from the fact that significant structural modification work was required for her sister vessel, the Silver Lining, before she was finally able to meet the required standard and allowed to sail.

A further indicator of the magnitude of Trident’s stability shortfall, is also given by the Sheriff himself (perhaps inadvertently) in paragraph [41] of his report:

…I am advised by Mr Macwhirter (and Professor Macfarlane at one point in his evidence appeared to support this) that all that would have been required in the design of the Trident to secure full compliance with the IMCO recommended criteria would have been a modest increase in the depth of her hull amidships of the order of 0.3 to 0.4 metres reducing to zero at the bow and the stern

We would suggest that a 'modest' increase in the depth of the Trident’s steel hull of 0.3 to 0.4m (i.e. a 10% increase in her depth) would have resulted in a totally different ship being built. One that would have had significantly improved intact stability reserves, as well as ‘specific sea-keeping characteristics’ markedly different from that of the hull that capsized.

The Advocate General and a number of the parties in the current investigation have sought to cloud these issues by raising number of related questions and offering a multitude of views that cannot be supported by the overriding facts of her loss. The Sheriff has now confirmed that he was willing to go along with this charade.

Some examples:

The Advocate General, in questions 8(b)(i) and (ii) sought the Court’s views on whether the Trident possessed intact stability characteristics that were in 'substantial compliance' with those recommended for fishing vessels by the DTI and DOT (i.e. the IMCO standard). The Sheriff was happy to provide positive answers to these questions in paragraph [29] of his report.

Note: The building specification and contract called for compliance with IMCO requirements not just ‘substantial compliance’. If it takes lengthening the ship by 10 feet or increasing its depth by 1.5 feet in order to obtain full compliance, then the difference between the DOT’s understanding of ‘substantial compliance’ and full compliance is rather substantial in itself.

The Advocate General, in questions 8(d) sought the Court’s views on whether the loss of the Trident was 'caused or materially contributed to by any lack of statical stability'. As a result of the confusion and disinformation that was allowed to enter into the case, the Sheriff was able, in paragraph [31], to provide the following unsatisfactory reply:

I think the answer to this question is no

Whilst the post of Sheriff Principal is a very senior position within the Scottish legal system, we do not think that this confers the right to challenge the established principles of Naval Architecture, which are irrefutably based on Archimedes and Newton’s laws.

The failure of Trident to meet her design specification in respect of a mandatory  [*] stability standard, and the fact that this was unresolved until she capsized can be viewed as nothing less than a serious design fault - and one in our view that was a material factor in her loss.

More to come…

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[*] It was mandatory in the sense that Governmental grant monies should not have been advanced for this vessel until it had been verified that she met the required stability standard. The whole purpose of the conditional grant scheme was to improve the stability (safety) of UK fishing vessels.

14 comments:

AJT said...

Thanks to Gadly for getting back to basics with the Trident saga. Before all the farce and confusion and disinformation of the RFI. The main point of contention with six of the families involved was the fact that Trident should have been tested before public money was given towards her cost. It is just as well that the builders of the Forth rail bridge never settled for 'substantial compliance' or the bridge might not have met in the middle , not really fit for trains ! Just as Trident proved not to be fit as a fishing vessel.

Best regards,
AJT.

Raj said...

Gadfly,
Thanks for your last post that was and is how the family viewed the need for compliance.
Having read some of the findings I see that the Sheriff was of the view that the Department only required substantial compliance, however on reading the relevant IMCO standard I cannot see that option, it does however state that the figures quoted were the minima. In addition the loan agreement from the WFA states compliance again and inclining test. It certainly does not say substantial compliance . The sheriff may or not be correct in what he states but does that make the practise a correct one?
Do the Department still only ask for substantial compliance, if not why not and when did it change?
The other point eluded to by Anonymous which relates to the 7.5 ton to be inserted into the model by request of the families , this I believe the sheriff covers in (45) of his report and as can be seen it was not accepted quite naturally by council for the WFA . It was not the families` proposition that it would have saved the vessel it was the results from the Freydn model that suggested it was a lot less likely to capsize . The worry here is that in not accepting the Freydn model it negates a rather large proportion of the MARIN report, which quite frankly is not too good. If it was no good for fishing vessels then why was it used ? There was also exception taken by Mr McWhirter who correctly pointed out that it trimmed the vessel by the head which was likely to cause a greater loss of directional control ( broaching) the decision to trim by the head was taken by the JPE the families experts asked for the trim to be kept the same .
The sheriff also commented on what was likely to have been done by the department and he concluded that adding 6-10 ton of ballast would have been the extent of their recommendations, this I am puzzled at as I cannot see the answer to why they did nothing or any criticism of nothing being done even though they had knowledge that the vessel was not compliant.

Apologises if there are any inaccuracies.

Best Regards Raj

gadfly said...

RAJ

In the 1970s to early 80s the DOT was in a position where they had to bring the entire UK fishing fleet (previously unregulated) into the strict survey and certification regime that was introduced by the 1975 Safety Provisions Rules. These regulations required full compliance with DOT (IMCO) stability standards for vessels that were defined as new vessels (keel lay after 1 April 1975) but only compliance so far as reasonable and practicable for existing fishing vessels whose keels were laid prior to 1/4/75 (Some existing fishing vessels would never have been able to meet the minimum UK stability standard and, as the Government did not wish to put a significant section of the existing fishing fleet out of business - some flexibility was allowed for accepting lower stability standards on existing fishing vessels)
At the time the Trident was lost the DOT (if they had had any input at all – they were not issuing fishing vessel safety certificates at that time) should have required full compliance with IMCO stability criteria as the Trident was a newish grant aid vessel.

So full compliance was required on all grant aid fishing vessels and new fishing vessels built after 1975, and compliance so far as reasonable and practicable for fishing vessels built before 1975 when they came to be issued with a safety certificate.

It is suggested that before 1975, contract law, rather than subjective opinions of what the DOT may or may not have accepted at that time should apply. That is the DOT were not party to the build contract.

As far as the MARIN tests are concerned, in our view these tests have no value as the scale model they tested did not have the lightship characteristics and deadweight distribution that corresponded with the Trident when lost.

With regard to what the department might have done, if the Trident had been surveyed in 1979 for the issue of a fishing vessel certificate, the minimum that the department would have required (not recommended) would have been the addition of 6-10 tonnes of ballast (this would be considered reasonable and practicable for a 6 year old existing fishing vessel); they may also have called for additional above-deck buoyancy, depending on the level of non-compliance.

Best regards,

Raj said...

Gadfly,
Thanks for your information , I will that up.

Raj

gadfly said...

RAJ,

It may be worth directing you to one of our earlier posts about the Gaul's stbility at http://the-trawler-gaul.blogspot.com/2010/02/stability-of-trawler-gaul-part-2.html, containing a pic which shows a part-print of a pre-1975 Rules stability certificate issued by the DOT for Gaul (in 1972). Note that the certificate refers to compliance, rather than substantial compliance. That certificate was possibly issued for the purpose of confirming that the WhiteFish grant stability conditions had been met. (!)

Anonymous said...

Is it possible that the Trident was also issued a stability certificate by the DOT?

gadfly said...

Anonymous @10:37

Well, you better ask the DfT this question.

What you should also note is that nobody from the DOT/DfT/MCA/MAIB was called to give evidence under oath during the hearings. So, the court was not made aware of just what they did at that time.

Regards

Raj said...

Gadfly,
On looking the payment was released after the vessel sailed, the " cetificate"
In part reads
“ the work carried out to that date is satisfactory and to the approved specification”
But what exactly would be the specification ?

Best Regards
Raj

gadfly said...

Raj,

The certificate you mention is presumably the one issued by the White Fish Authority, not by the DOT.

The specification would be the builders' specification that formed part of the build contract. This specification would have been reviewed and approved by White Fish and that is what they would refer to.

The certificate issued for the Gaul by the DOT would possibly have been an additional requirement by either White Fish or the Owner - or supplied by the Builder.

Best regards

Raj said...

Gadfly,
Mau I assume that would be the one that stipulates IMCO compliance and an Inclining test ?!

Best Regards
Raj

gadfly said...

Yes, the builder's specification gives full details of what is being purchased by the future boat owner as well as the technical specifications and requirements for the vessel that the builder's design must satisfy. It is an integral part of the contract.

Best regards

Raj said...

Gadfly,
Now I am getting slightly confused I was convinced I heard evidence that the vessel did not have to be compliant now looking at court production 3.2.3 part 3
Page 2 Main scantling drawings to be approved by Lloyds , I don`t think this was the case.
Further down on page 2 it states vessel to be inclined and to meet IMCO requirements .
I`m getting seriously unhappy about this how can anyone state any different and get away with this.!!!

Raj said...

Gadfly,
Re: another post, court production 3.2.3 part 3 page 2 !!

Says it all.
I`m beginning to feel conned.
Best Regards
Raj

gadfly said...

Raj,

Unfortunately, the court productions, transcripts of evidence, videos from the MARIN tests, 1975 report of court etc etc are not in the public domain (they are secret). However, regarding your comments on Lloyds - they would not have been happy to only approve the steel drawings on Trident, they generally like to give a full service (plan approval, survey during build and issue of Class certificate) or nothing.
If the specification cannot be fulfilled for one reason or another or it is exceeded, then these would be 'extra to spec' and there could be a price adjustment either way.
However, the IMCO stability and inclining test would have been non-negotiable because they were a pre-requisite for the Whitefish grant.

Best regards